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FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN LONG TERM CARE
MARIE-THERESE CONNOLLY, J.D.*
Scarce do I pass a day, but that I hear
Some one or other's dead, and to my ear
Me thinks it is no news. But oh! did I
Think deeply on it, what it is to die,
My pulses all would beat, I should not be
Drowned in this deluge of security.**
Records maintained by State surveyors, charged with inspecting
certain types of long term care entities, contained the following nota-
tions for a single facility:
" June 1992: "More than 25 maggots removed from a patient's
nostril and the tape holding in her nasogastric tube."
* November 1993: "Staffing has been depleted badly. Patients are
not receiving good care, [There were] 6 deaths this past
weekend."
" January 1995: "[Patient] was admitted about noon. . .; died
about midnight... patient was supposed to be suctioned every
10 - 20 minutes. Patient was not suctioned for the last 6 & 1/2
hours of her life. Patient choked to death."
" March 1996: "[An] anonymous complainant alleg[es] that
there is an outbreak of scabies amongst the patients in the
facility."
" April 1996: "On Sunday... there were 2 RNs and 2 CNAs for
the entire [facility]. The census was 84 patients. There was 1
RN on [one area] for 18 critically ill patients. Complainant's
mother has a Stage IV decubitus. She was not turned for 12
hours."1
* Senior Trial Counsel, United States Department of Justice and Coordinator of the
Department's Nursing Home and ElderJustice Initiatives. The views expressed in this arti-
cle are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department ofJustice. I
am grateful to my current and past colleagues at the Departments of Justice and Health
and Human Services for their guidance, indulgence, and friendship which has been criti-
cal to the completion of this article and to the ongoing work on elder abuse and long term
care issues. Any flaws in the article are mine alone.
** Philip Pain, Meditation 8, in QUEST FOR REALITY 71, (Yvor Winters & Kenneth Fields,
eds.).
1. These are the findings of state survey teams assessing the conditions within a long-
term care facility from June 1992-April 1996. The records are on file with the author.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the gravity of the findings above, and the fact that the
facility in question was one of hundreds owned by the same chain, the
allegations were not referred to law enforcement until long after
1996, and then by a former employee-whistleblower. Historically, law
enforcement 2 rarely has been involved in matters relating to abuse
and neglect in long term care. Reports of grave and wide-spread
abuse and neglect in such facilities have persisted for decades, receiv-
ing attention in fits and starts.' Despite some improvements over
time, recent reports continue to cite serious ongoing problems, in-
cluding that an estimated one third to one quarter of nursing homes
provide seriously deficient or potentially life-threatening care;4 that
almost one third of all nursing homes are cited for abuse-related defi-
ciencies;5 and that an estimated 50%6 to 90%' of all nursing homes
are understaffed at levels that have been shown to harm residents.
2. The term "law enforcement" is used in this article to encompass the full range of
potential federal, state, and local law enforcement responses including police intervention,
investigation, and prosecution.
3. See U.S. Sen. Special Comm. on Aging, Elder Abuse: The Case for Congressional
Action Now, 1974-present (on file with the author); Amanda Beeler & Scott Fornek, Ideas,
But No Easy Answers to Fight Abuse, CHICAGO SUN, Dec. 19, 2001, available at http://www.sun
times.com/special-sections/elder/cst-nws-reforml9.html; COMMITrEE ON NURSING HOME
REGULATION, INSTITUTE OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALI=Y OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES
(1986) [hereinafter IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
NURSING HOMES: MORE CAN BE DONE TO PROTECT RESIDENTS FROM ABUSE, (GAO-02-
312) (2002) [hereinafter 2002 GAO Report].
4. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CALIF. NURSING HOMES: FED. AND STATE OVER-
SIGHT INADEQUATE TO PROTECT RESIDENTS IN HOMES WITH SERIOUS CARE VIOLATIONS, 2
(GAO/HEHS-98-219) (1998) [hereinafter 1998 GAO Report]. GAO examined California
nursing homes and concluded that nearly one third had been cited for providing seriously
or potentially life-threatening care. It reported that "even when the state cites serious defi-
ciencies, HCFA's enforcement policies have not been effective in ensuring that the defi-
ciencies are corrected and remain corrected." Id. The GAO examined care provided to a
sample of 62 residents who had died during the year from malnutrition, dehydration, pres-
sure sores, or urinary tract infections with sepsis, and found that more than half of those
residents had received unacceptable care. Id. Soon thereafter, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Evaluations and
Inspections (OEI) issued a report reaching very similar conclusions: OEI concluded that
13 of 25 quality deficiencies were on the rise, including pressure sores, accidents, and
failure to provide proper care for the activities of daily living; that long term care
ombudsman complaints had increased since 1989 even while inadequate resources limit
their capacity. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES: AN OVERVIEW, 1-2 (OEI-02-00-00060) (1999). OEI
also noted that it was still unclear whether new law enforcement initiatives would have any
impact. See id. at 4.
5. See Minority Staff, Special Investigations Division, Comm. on Gov't Reform, U.S.
H.R., Abuse of Residents is a Major Problem in U.S. Nursing Homes, July 30, 2001, at http://
www.house.gov/reform/min/inves-nursing/index.htm#anchabuse [hereinafter Abuse of
2001]
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Even where misconduct by an entity or individual constitutes
egregious abuse and neglect, causing illness, suffering, and sometimes
death of frail residents, in the past, law enforcement rarely has been
timely notified or become involved.8 When it did become involved,
typically the cases were the province of state and local law enforce-
Residents]. This study, released in early August 2001 by Congressman Waxman, reports that
about one third of nursing homes were cited for abuse-related deficiencies. The study
examines four deficiencies or "tags" - F-223 is actual substantiated abuse, F-224 is cited
when a facility fails to write or use policies that forbid mistreatment, abuse, neglect, and
misappropriation, and F-225 is cited when a facility fails to hire staff without histories of
abuse behaviors, or fails to report and investigate allegations of abuse, and F-226 is cited
when a facility fails to implement the policies it writes to forbid mistreatment, abuse, neg-
lect, and misappropriation. Thus, only one of the tags in question is for cases of substanti-
ated abuse. What this and most reports have even greater difficulty capturing is neglect,
even when it is systemic and/or egregious and leads to injury or death in at least one and
sometimes numerous individuals.
6. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: APPROPRIATENESS OF
MINIMUM NURSE STAFFING RATIOS IN NURSING HOMES, E.S.-5, 2000 [hereinafter STAFFING
RATIOS]. OBRA '87 required HCFA/CMS to analyze nursing home staffing. HCFA/CMS
released Phase I of the long anticipated study in July 2000. The study concluded that 54%
of all nursing homes are understaffed for nursing aides and it demonstrated a correlation
between understaffing and harm to residents. See id.
7. A companion study to the one described supra, note 6, announced the same day,
concluded that 92% of all nursing homes are not staffed to "optimum" levels. See STAFFING
RATIos, supra note 6 at E.S.-5. Optimum levels were conservatively defined and assumed
maximum productivity of nursing staff. See id. See also CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS: APPROPRIATENESS OF MINIMUM NURSE STAFFING RATIOS IN
NURSING HOMES, PHASE II FINAL REPORT, 2002. A February 18, 2002 article by Robert Pear
in the New York Times reports that the staffing study concludes that nine out of ten nurs-
ing homes "had nurse aide staffing levels that fell below the thresholds identified as mini-
mally necessary to provide the needed care." See Robert Pear, 9 of 10 Nursing Homes Lack
Adequate Staff Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, 11. The article notes that the report "found 'strong
and compelling' evidence that nursing homes with a low ratio of nursing personnel to
patients were more likely to provide substandard care." Id. Patients in these homes were
more likely to experience a variety of injuries and illnesses, including bedsores, malnutri-
tion, weight loss, dehydration, pneumonia and serious blood-borne infections. See id. In
addition, it reported that " 'over 40 percent of all nursing homes would need to increase
nurse aide staffing by 50 percent or more to reach the minimum threshold associated with
their resident population.' " Id.
8. See 2002 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 4. See also an Administration on Aging study
that concludes that "for every abused and/or neglected elder reported to and substanti-
ated by APS, there are over five abused and/or neglected elders that are not reported." See
Admin. on Aging, The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study; Final Report, 1998, available at
http://www.aoa.dhhs.gov/abuse/report. Many assume that this AoA study underestimates
the amount of underreporting. See Sidney M. Stahl, The Need for a National Investment in
Research on Elder Abuse and Neglect, in ELDER JUSTICE: MED. FORENSIC ISSUES RELATING TO
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 1 117 (U.S. Dep't of Justice., eds., 2001) [hereinafter MED. FORENSIC
ISSUES]. (stating "The study design used to acquire these data is problematic and represent
a significant underestimate.").
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ment, and most often pursued against low level individual wrongdo-
ers, to the extent cases were pursued at all.9
Against this background law enforcement at all levels has height-
ened its focus on this issue. The Senate Special Committee on Aging
held a hearing in March 2002, during which the Government Ac-
counting Office (GAO) released a report concluding, and witnesses
testified, that physical and sexual abuse in nursing homes is not re-
ported to law enforcement on a timely basis, and rarely prosecuted.' °
Some state legislatures have enacted new laws providing additional
causes of action that better fit the offenses in question."1 Some states
and communities have increased the priority of pursuing long term
care and/or elder abuse and neglect issues. 12 Similarly, in recent
years, the Department of Justice has made these issues a priority,
launching its Nursing Home and Elder Justice Initiatives, pursuing
more cases involving abuse and neglect in long term care, and ex-
panding efforts in the "administration of justice."1
The first section of this article - Summary - provides an overview of
federal efforts - both in the enforcement of federal law and in the ad-
ministration of justice. The second section - Background - discusses
the context in which these cases and issues arise, briefly reviewing so-
bering reports of abuse, neglect, and other problems in long term
care, the demographic trends that are increasing the demand for
quality long term care, the ever-shifting nature of providers, and the
role of a few of the myriad entities and programs with a role in assur-
ing the quality of long term care. The third section - Federal Law En-
forcement - reviews examples of the civil, criminal, and civil rights cases
that the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) has pursued as
the agency responsible for enforcing federal law. The fourth section -
Administration ofJustice - reviews the Department's efforts (other than
pursuing cases) to enhance the knowledge base and to improve the
prevention, intervention in, and prosecution of elder abuse and
neglect.
9. But see cases cited infra notes 89-92 & 94.
10. See 2002 GAO Report, supra note 3; Hearings Before the Special Committee on
Aging, United States Senate, Safeguarding our Seniors: Protecting the Elderly from Physi-
cal and Sexual Abuse in Nursing Homes, 107th Cong., 2d Sess (2002).
11. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2713 (2001).
12. See, e.g., Warren Wolf, Elder Abuse Team Striving to Protect the Vulnerable, STAR TRiBUNE
(Minnesota), Dec. 27, 2001, at http://www.startribune.com/stories/462/923513.html.
13. See Elder Justice (last modified June 6, 2001) <http://www.usdoj.gov/eldejustice.
htm>. The Department's administration of justice efforts include providing for training
and coordination, recommending new laws to fill gaps in legislation, increasing public
awareness, funding promising research and programs, and pursuing other measures.
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I. SUMMARY
Employed individually or in combination, federal law enforce-
ment possesses a spectrum of tools that can be brought to bear to
punish wrongdoing, recoup lost government funds, deter future
wrongdoing, protect residents, and promote better care. Those tools
include the False Claims Act,14 common law,15 equity, 16 several poten-
tial criminal statutes,17 and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Per-
sons Act (CRIPA).'s Together with the exclusion authority, corporate
integrity agreements and divestiture agreements pursued by the De-
partment of Health and Human Service's Office of Inspector General
(HHS/OIG), and the programmatic remedies available to the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal entities, work-
ing individually and in collaboration with one another have a variety
of tools with which to punish wrongdoing, recoup government funds,
protect residents, and promote better long term care. 9
Significantly, the Department, HHS/OIG and CMS have worked
closely and creatively on long term care matters, combining and bal-
ancing the entities' respective yet overlapping regulatory, public
health, and law enforcement goals. 9° Similarly, vigorous anti-fraud ef-
forts must remain a priority to protect the Medicare and Medicaid
trust funds, so that those programs are not unnecessarily and unlaw-
fully depleted, as the number of beneficiaries skyrockets and demand
on the programs grows.
Greater involvement of federal law enforcement in this area is
not only appropriate, but imperative. It is warranted to protect the
more than $50 billion in federal funds that flow to long term care
14. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2001).
15. See United States v. Cripps, 460 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Ill. 1980).
16. See Blusal Meats, Inc. v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. N.Y. 1986), affd, 817
F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1987).
17. See infra note 269.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2001).
19. There is no federal long term care abuse and neglect statute. In 2000, the Depart-
ment proposed, and OMB cleared, a proposal for such a statute providing the Department
with authority to pursue criminal, civil and injunctive remedies where patterns of violations
of underlying quality provisions resulted in harm to residents. The proposed bill never
gained real momentum in Congress and was not enacted. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c) (1) (4) (ii)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (c) (1) (A) (ii), however, make explicit reference to the rights of nurs-
ing home residents to be free of abuse.
20. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Vencor and Ventas Paying U.S. $219 Mil-
lion to Resolve Health Care Claims as Part of Vencor's Bankruptcy Reorganization (Mar.
19, 2001).
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annually to care for beneficiaries.2 1 It is warranted because many long
term care providers are now multi-state or multi-national entities, ne-
cessitating national coordination.22 It is warranted in light of the
large number of nursing home providers that have sought protection
of federal bankruptcy laws. 23 It is warranted in light of the increasing
number of failure of care False Claims Act qui tam cases that trigger a
federal inquiry into allegations. It is warranted because reports of
abuse and neglect persist and may be on the rise. And it is warranted
because those who need long term care are extremely vulnerable and
dependant on that care being provided consistent with legal stan-
dards. Sometimes their very survival depends on the full and proper
enforcement of the law. For these reasons and more, there is a sub-
stantial federal interest in enforcing the relevant laws that bear on
quality long term care.
While law enforcement should have a significant role in address-
ing failures in long term care, it is only one piece of the puzzle. Legis-
lation, public awareness, reimbursement policy, regulation, facility
surveys, administrative enforcement, advocacy, increased staffing, and
- most critical of all - the providers' own commitment to the care they
provide - in some combination usually come into play before law en-
forcement. In a perfect world those forces would obviate the need for
law enforcement.
But the world is not perfect, and when these mechanisms fail,
and especially when there are multiple failures and injuries or deaths
due to wrongdoing, law enforcement should play a role. The con-
verse of recognizing that law enforcement is a blunt tool that should
be used sparingly, is the recognition that it is a powerful tool that
should be used in appropriate circumstances. It can and should oper-
ate as a backstop to the many other mechanisms in place to promote
quality long term care for our nation's most vulnerable citizens. As
long as reports of abuses persist, law enforcement must do its part to
redress those abuses.
Less well known than the Department's cases are its efforts to
fund, promote, or provide education and training, assessment of
needs, research, promising practices, coordination, recommending
21. See HCFA, Nursing Home Care Expenditures and Average Annual Percent Change,
by Source of Funds: Selected Calendar Years 1970-2008, at http://www.managedcaredi-
gest.com/is2000/is2000.html.
22. See U.S. HOUSE OF REP., NURSING HOME CONDITIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:
MANY HOMES FAIL TO MEET FEDERAL STANDARDS fOR ADEQUATE CARE 7 (Jan. 7, 2002) [here-
inafter NURSING HOME CONDITIONS].
23. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
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new laws, and raising awareness. These efforts are broad-based and
their focus is not only prosecution, but also prevention, treatment,
and interventions other than or in addition to prosecution. It is
widely acknowledged that our knowledge of and response to elder
abuse and neglect lags decades behind other complex problems, such
as domestic violence and child abuse and neglect.2" Whereas these
other issues, over the course of the past decades, have come to be
considered law enforcement issues, the same cannot yet be said for
elder abuse and neglect.25 A seasoned police officer who is knowl-
edgeable about the topic recently remarked that many officers would
rather go into a crack house than a nursing home.
As in any other type of prosecution, identification, collection, and
preservation of forensic evidence also is critical in elder abuse and
neglect cases. Unfortunately, little is known about forensic markers of
abuse and neglect, or forensic methods that should be used in identi-
fying and collecting evidence, because the area has been almost com-
pletely devoid of research. 26 For example, there are few evidence-
based benchmarks to establish or even provide guidance on which
types of bruising, fractures, decubitus ulcers, malnutrition, or dehy-
dration (among other conditions) are more likely to be evidence of
abuse and/or neglect as distinguished from those conditions that
were caused by aging or disease unrelated to abuse or neglect.2 7 Ex-
cept in obvious cases, healthcare, social service, and emergency re-
sponse professionals are not trained and do not possess the tools to
identify likely abuse and neglect.28 Even where it is suspected, few
entities have reporting protocols, and it is very rarely reported, 29 de-
spite mandatory reporting laws in all but six states. 30 Even when it is
reported, it may not be prosecuted for reasons that may include inad-
equate causes of action, inexperience in the investigation and prose-
cution of these often complex cases, a paucity of medical experts in
the area, and scarce if any resources or priority allocated to the pur-
24. See Catherine Hawes, Elder Abuse in Residential Long-Term Care Facilities: What is
Known and What Information is Needed? 30 (Sept. 27, 2001) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author) [hereinafter Elder Abuse in Residential Long-Term Care].
25. See id.
26. See Dyer et al., The Clinical and Medical Forensics of Elder Abuse and Neglect 3
(2001) (unpublished manuscript commissioned by the National Academy of Sciences) (on
file with the author) [hereinafter Clinical and Medical Forensics].
27. See id.
28. See id. at 5.
29. See id. at 3; 2002 GAO Report, supra note 3.
30. The states that do not have mandatory reporting laws as of 12/31/2001 are Colo-
rado, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
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suit of these matters. Progress in each of these issues is critical to the
ability of law enforcement at all levels to effectively pursue these cases.
Experience in the fields of child abuse and neglect, domestic vio-
lence, and even in the less developed elder abuse and neglect field,
suggests that multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary efforts are most
effective. 3 Factors including the often extreme vulnerability of the
victim, the special relationships between abuser and victim, and victim
dependence on those who may abuse and neglect them, demand the
individual and collaborative attention of healthcare, social service,
public safety, regulatory and law enforcement professionals to reach
an effective resolution.3 2
Enabling legislation and the ensuing creation of an Office of Ju-
venile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in 1974 and the
Violence Against Women Office in 1995 - have led to increased focus
on, funding for, and great strides in these areasY No similar infra-
structure exists yet to create a focus at the national level on the pre-
vention, intervention in, and prosecution of abuse and neglect of
older Americans.
Some efforts, however, are underway, and there clearly is a signifi-
cant role to be played by federal law enforcement, in coordination
with other entities, to provide leadership, advance the knowledge
base, and develop strategic, collaborative, and effective responses to
address these issues, particularly as the number of frail and older
Americans and the corresponding need for quality long term care
soars.
II. BACKGROUND
To put the role of federal law enforcement in context, this article
first briefly reviews the reported problems, the growing need for qual-
ity long term care, the nature of the industry, and the primary players
and programs.
31. See ErikJ. Lindbloom, How Can We Identify Physical and Psychological Markers of Abuse
and Neglect? in MED. FORENSIC ISSUES, supra note 8, 133.
32. See Hawes, Abuse in Long-Term Care, supra note 24, at 7.
33. See Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5601
(1994). The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has a web site at http:/
/ojjdp.ncjrs.org/about/about.html; Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981 (1995). The Violence Against Women Office has a web site at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/vawa.
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A. The Players and Programs
Those discussing law enforcement involvement in long term care
often conflate the many potential enforcement entities into a single
monolith, when in fact there are many distinct players. 34 In examin-
ing the role of law enforcement in long term care, it is critical to con-
sider both administrative and law enforcement options, as well as
other potential players. A brief overview of some of the relevant enti-
ties and programs follows.
Providers. The entity with primary responsibility for assuring qual-
ity care is the provider itself and those responsible for its operation.
The provider assumes the duty to have in place the staff, resources,
and procedures necessary to provide the necessary care and comply
with the relevant medical and legal standards. 5
The Medicare and Medicaid Programs. The Social Security Act of
193536 included a federal old age insurance program and grants to
states for assistance to the elderly called "Old Age Assistance."3 7 Fed-
eral jurisdiction over the quality of care that nursing homes provide
began with the creation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in
1965, as part of the Great Society programs. 38 Medicare pays for med-
ical care for persons aged 65 and older, and for persons with disabili-
ties.39 The Medicaid Act established an elaborate statutory scheme
under which the federal government and the states jointly finance
medical assistance for individuals unable to afford necessary medical
services.4 Both Medicare and Medicaid pay for care provided in nurs-
ing homes. Medicare will pay for up to 100 days of skilled nursing
34. See Joan H. Krause, The Fraud and Abuse Conundrum, at http://law.slu.edu/health
law/research/doc analysis/krauseessay.html (last visited 1/15/2002).
35. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.20 (2000). Among other things, providers are required, at the
time of a resident's admission and regularly thereafter, to conduct a comprehensive, accu-
rate, standardized assessment of the resident's medical and psychosocial needs, nutritional
status, skin condition, continence, and functional capacity. See id.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2000).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). Nursing homes receive substantial government monies
- about $10.9 billion from Medicare in 2000 and $42.3 billion from Medicaid ($24.1 bil-
lion federal share and $18.2 billion state share) in FY 2000. Spending for long term care is
even greater - in 1999 approximately $18 billion in Medicare and $59 billion in Medicaid
dollars, for a total of $77 billion. In general, nursing homes receive about 65% of their
funds from Medicaid, 10% from Medicare, and 25% through a combination of insurance,
private pay and other.
38. See Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1998).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1998). For a more extensive discussion of these provisions, see
Kristine Blackwood and Howard Daniels, Analysis & Perspective: Nursing Home Liability for
Failure of Care Under False Claims Act, 6 BNA HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 3 (2002).
[VOL. 4:230
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
care that follows a qualifying hospital stay.4' Medicaid eligibility is de-
fined by the states, but usually is available to financially needy individ-
uals who need skilled care or other assistance with activities of daily
living.4 2
To participate in the Medicare program, providers must be li-
censed by the state, enter into provider agreements with CMS,4  and
be certified as being in compliance with mandatory federal stan-
dards.44 To participate in Medicaid, nursing facilities must enter into
agreements with the states that incorporate the federal requirements
for participation, as well as applicable state requirements, and be certi-
fied as being in compliance with the quality requirements under 42
U.S.C. § 1396r (b)-(d) and the standards governing payment under 42
C.F.R. Part 442.
In the mid-1970s, reports of widespread abuse and neglect in
nursing homes, and the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of
Medicine's (IOM) issuance of a report in 1986 called "Improving the
Quality of Care in Nursing Homes,"45 catalyzed enactment of a sweep-
ing Nursing Home Reform Act, incorporated in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987.46 OBRA '87 aimed to ensure that nursing
home residents achieve and maintain the "highest practicable physi-
cal, mental, and psychosocial well-being."4 7
Among other things, OBRA '87 expanded and defined the qual-
ity of life and quality of care requirements on which Medicare and
Medicaid participation is conditioned, changed the survey process to
focus more on resident outcomes, and required state survey agencies
and providers to share survey information with federal and state inves-
tigators, specifically including state Medicaid Fraud Control Units.48
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a) (2) (A) (2001).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2001).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1) (1998); 42 C.F.R. § 442.12 (2001).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)-(d) (1998); 42 C.F.R. § 483.1 (2001).
45. See IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE, supra note 3. The IOM recommended an over-
haul of the nursing home regulatory system and the development of a comprehensive
system that would focus on patients' rights, actual delivery and quality of care, and the
results of that care. See id. See also Medicaid and Medicare Long Term Care Survey, 53 Fed.
Reg. 22850, 22850 (1988).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (2001) (standards for Medicare-funded skilled nursing facili-
ties); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (2001) (parallel standards for Medicaid-funded nursing facilities).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b) (2) (2001); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r(b) (2), 1395i-3 (2001)
(governing quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (2001) (establish-
ing identical standards for Medicaid-funded nursing facilities); 42 C.F.R. § 483 (1998) (im-
plementing quality provisions).
48. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r (2001).
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State and Federal Surveyors. The Centers for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services (CMS, formerly the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (HCFA)) administers the Medicare program, oversees the states'
implementation of the Medicaid program, and is charged with ensur-
ing that providers meet federal care standards. OBRA '87 established
a review and enforcement scheme pursuant to which state agencies,
under contract with CMS, are primarily responsible for regularly mon-
itoring and enforcing compliance with the quality of care standards
through on-site inspections. 49 In conducting these surveys, state sur-
veyors must apply detailed federal standards and use the protocols
and forms required in the federal regulations.5' During such surveys,
which are conducted unannounced approximately every 9 - 15
months, surveyors determine whether a particular facility is in compli-
ance with criteria drawn from the statute and regulations set forth in
the state operations manual (SOM). 5 1 Problems uncovered by the
surveyor, called "deficiencies," are in turn categorized (on a "grid")
by scope and severity52 - and include the extent to which they jeop-
ardize one or more residents' health or well being.53
Federal surveyors, who work for CMS, may conduct "look be-
hind 54 surveys, which they do in about five percent of cases.55 Both
state and federal surveyors may respond to complaints - called "com-
plaint surveys."56 In the wake of the numerous bankruptcies of nurs-
ing home chains, CMS in 1999 asked the state surveyors also to
conduct surveys of each facility owned by a bankrupt entity within 30
days of the bankruptcy filing to assure that the financial crisis did not
have an immediate adverse effect on the residents.57
Ombudsman. The Older Americans Act 58 (OAA) created the long
term care ombudsman program in 1978."9 Each state has state and
local long term care ombudsmen who are responsible for represent-
49. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395aa(a), 1396r(g) (1) (A) (2001); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.108,
488.10(a), 488.20, 488.301 (1998).
50. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 431.610(f)(1) (1998).
51. See CMS, State Operations Manual, at http://www.hcfa.gov/pubforms/07-som/
pub07.toc.htm [hereinafter State Operations Manual].
52. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 431.610(0(1) (1998).
53. See id. See also State Operations Manual, supra note 51 § 7000.
54. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (33) (B), 1396i(b)(1) (2001).
55. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (33) (B), 1396i(b) (1) (2001).
56. See State Operations Manual, supra note 51 §§ 3281-3284.
57. See Testimony of Steven Pelovitz, Director, Survey & Certification Group, HCFA, on
Nursing Home Bankrupticies before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 9/5/2000,
available at http://www.hcfa.gov/testimony/2000/090500.htm.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1994).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 3011 (1994).
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ing the interests of nursing home residents.6" Some ombudsmen are
paid; many are volunteers.6 Some work for state departments of
health, aging, or other government entities.62 Others work through
legal services, or, in at least one case, through AARP.65 Many
ombudsman work on a shoe-string budget.64 Ombudsman are re-
quired to maintain information they obtain from and about their cli-
ents confidential. 65  These confidentiality requirements have been
upheld, even in the case of a subpoena.66 Ombudsmen's authority
vary from state-to-state. In a few states, long term care ombudsman
are authorized to conduct investigations. For example, New Mexico's
ombudsman are authorized to conduct undercover operations in long
term care facilities, including nursing homes and assisted living
facilities.67
Adult Protective Services. In 1962 Congress enacted the Public Wel-
fare Amendments to the Social Security Act authorizing payments to
states for protective services to "persons with physical and/or mental
limitations who were unable to manage their own affairs. . .or who
were neglected or exploited."68 In 1974 Title XX of the Social Secur-
ity Act required the states to implement Adult Protective Services pro-
grams at the state level for adults 18 and older.69 Most states within a
few years passed elder abuse laws. 7' There was no model legislation,
however, and state law is all over the map.71 Many states used child
60. See id.
61. See Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program, <http://www.aoa.gov/factsheets/
ombudsman.html> (last modified 12/14/2001).
62. See id.
63. See AARP, What We Do, (visited 12/31/2001) <http://www.aarp.org/foundation/
capability.html>.
64. See e.g., Office of the Long Term Care Ombudsman-Budget, <http://www.sos.state.
or.us/ BlueBook/ 1999_2000/state/executive/LongTermCare/long-term care_
budget.htm> (visited 12/19/2001).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 3058g (2001).
66. See Genesis Eldercare Network Serv. v. Courtland Healthcare, No. 98-06023
(Chester Co., Pa. Ct. C. P. 1998).
67. See New Mexico State Agency on Aging Three Year Plan, at <http://www.nmaging.
state.nm.us/plan2000.html> (last visited 12/19/2001); Press Release, New Mexico State
Agency on Aging, State Agency on Aging Uncovers Poor Treatment in Three Long-Term
Care Facilities (Aug. 9, 1999).
68. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 172,
188 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1996 & Supp. V 1981)).
69. See Social Services Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, §§ 2000-2006, 88 Stat.
2337-48 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397a-e (West Supp. 1998)).
70. See e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-21 (West 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-
A §§ 4001-4014 (West 1999).
71. See Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny From the Wolf. Elder Abuse and Neglect-The Legal
Framework, 31 CONN. L. REv. 77, 90 (1998).
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abuse legislation as a model for reporting laws.72 This model some-
times was useful and other times was problematic and resulted in vio-
lation of some older people's civil rights.73 APS has authority to
investigate allegations of abuse and neglect in facilities in only about
half of the states and the nature of its authority varies from state-to-
state.74
Administrative Enforcement. Often the term "enforcement" relating
to long term care is used to refer to administrative efforts to enforce
the statutory and regulatory standards governing nursing homes that
are implemented by CMS and/or by state agencies for health, aging,
and human welfare which have concurrent jurisdiction over nursing
homes, and, in some states, other types of long term care facilities.75
Federal and state administrative enforcement cases far outnumber law
enforcement cases brought in response to problems in nursing
homes.7 6
OBRA '87 provided CMS with a broad panoply of potential reme-
dies, ranging from the severe (termination) to the mild (directed
plans of correction) and adding a number of intermediate mea-
sures.77 These remedies include:
(1) Termination of provider
(2) Termination of payments to the provider
(3) Imposition of Civil Monetary Penalties (CMPs)
(4) Denial of payment for existing and new admissions
(5) Temporary management
(6) Temporary monitoring
(7) Directed plans of correction78
72. See id. at 158.
73. See Audrey S. Garfield, Elder Abuse and the State's Adult Protective Services Response:
Time for a Change in California, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 859, 877-80 (1991).
74. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-1401 (1995) (does allow intervention); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 48.003 (1999) (does not allow intervention).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (1995); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 483 (1997); 42
C.F.R. § 488 (1997); Mo. REv. STAT. § 198 (1994 & Supp. 1998); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 4/
45 (West 1998); Special Committee on Aging, Ca. Nursing Homes: Care Problems Persist
Despite Federal and State Oversight 1 (Letter Report, July 27, 1998, GAO/HEHS-98-202)
[hereinafter Care Problems Persist]; Angela Snellenberger Quinn, Comment, ImposingFed-
eral Criminal Liability on Nursing Homes: A Way of Deterring Inadequate Health Care and Improv-
ing the Quality of Care Delivered? 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 653, 660 (1990).
76. Federal actors rarely have jurisdiction in cases relating to long term care facilities
that do not receive federal funds. Depending on its law, a state may pursue administrative
or law enforcement action.
77. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.400 (1998).
78. Id.
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Notably, OBRA greatly expanded the administrative remedies
available to CMS to enforce compliance with the federally-mandated
standards79 and provided it with greater flexibility and range in deter-
mining the appropriate remedy in any given case.80 After a survey,
facilities must submit a plan of correction to CMS and/or the state
survey agency for approval, unless the agency has identified only iso-
lated deficiencies." If a facility is not in compliance within three
months after the agency's finding of non-compliance, CMS must deny
payment for new admissions to the facility until it determines that the
facility is in substantial compliance with all the requirements. 82 Sub-
stantial compliance is defined in the regulations as "a level of compli-
ance with the requirements of participation such that any identified
deficiencies pose no greater risk to resident health or safety than the
potential for causing minimal harm." 3 If three consecutive standard
surveys find evidence of substandard quality of care, CMS must deny
payment for new admissions and monitor the facility until it comes
back into compliance.84
Many states also have enacted patient's rights and quality of care
statutes paralleling or expanding on the provisions of OBRA. 85 Some
of these provisions are additional requirements of participation in the
health care programs.8 6
Significantly, CMS' remedies arise out of the "participation agree-
ment" entered into between CMS and the individual entity.87 Thus
CMS administrative enforcement actions run only to a single facility
and not to a chain, which, in cases involving systemic problems
originating from a national or regional headquarters, may limit the
scope and effectiveness of a facility-specific remedy.
State and Local Law Enforcement. Law enforcement officials at the
state and/or local levels include district attorneys, states attorneys,
county attorneys, as well as state and local police, sheriffs, coroners,
medical examiners and others. State law enforcement also includes
Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCUs) which have a central role in
prosecuting abuse and neglect in medicaid funded facilities, and
which may under recent legislation pursue cases arising in non-Medi-
79. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(h), 1396r(h) (2001).
80. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.400 (2001).
81. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.402(d) (2001).
82. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.417(2)(b) (2001).
83. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301 (2001).
84. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.422(b) (2001).
85. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-357 (West 1997).
86. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-537 (1997).
87. See Provider Agreement, HCFA form 1561. See also 42 C.F.R. § 489 (1999).
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caid funded facilities where two or more residents reside.8" States'
Attorneys General (AGs) in some states also pursue cases involving
abuse and neglect in long term care facilities.
Historically, such abuse and neglect cases have been the province
of state and local efforts, which have differed, sometimes significantly,
from state-to-state and community-to-community89 depending on the
existing state laws, enforcement practices, priorities, and resources.9 °
The Medicaid Fraud Control Units, which have taken the lead in pur-
suing long term care abuse and neglect, have pursued cases, not only
against lower level employees accused of abuse and neglect, but also
against owners, managers, controlling individuals, and corporate enti-
88. The MFCUs are federally funded and overseen, but often part of the state AG's
offices. See, e.g., Medicaid Fraud Control Unit <http://attorneygeneral.state.wy.us/
mfcu.htm> (last modified 12/17/2001) (Wyoming); AGO Online: Fighting Fraud, <http:/
/www.ago.state.mo.us/fraud.htm> (last modified 8/21/2001) (Missouri).
Congress conditioned each state's participation in the MFCU program on its formula-
tion of "procedures for reviewing complaints of the abuse and neglect of patients of health
care facilities that receive payments under the State [Medicaid] plan" and, where appropri-
ate, prosecuting such cases or referring them to other state agencies for prosecution. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396b(q) (2001); 42 C.F.R. § 1007.11 (1998). MFCUs also, at their discretion, may
pursue cases arising in non-Medicaid funded facilities where two or more residents reside.
See id. MFCUs devote substantial resources to patient abuse investigations and review
thousands of referrals alleging patient abuse, neglect, and the misappropriation of patient
funds. In 1996, over 4,000 of these cases were investigated by the MCFUs. See also National
Ass'n of Medicaid Fraud Control Units, Patient Abuse & Neglect: The Hidden Crime (1998), at
www.state.nv.us/ag/mfcu/intro-pabuse.htm.
89. There is no centralized data base of long term care abuse and neglect cases
brought by state or local prosecutors, let alone one that sorts cases by category, such as
those involving systemic violations brought against individual or corporate owners, manag-
ers, or other high level personnel in long term care entities.
90. A broad variety of state laws may have a bearing on abuse and neglect in long term
care, for example laws redressing assault, battery, theft, rape, abuse, endangerment, and
criminal neglect.
Charges have been successfully brought in state criminal prosecutions against both
corporate and individual defendants. See D.P. Chapus, Criminal Liability Under Statutes Pe-
nalizing Abuse or Neglect of the Institutionalized Infirm, 60 A.L.R. 4th 1153 (1988). For exam-
ple, in Missouri v. Boone Retirement Center, Inc., 26 S.W. 3d 265 (Mo. 2000), a nursing home
corporation and its administrator were convicted by ajury of two counts of felony neglect
of nursing home residents. See id. at 268. The nursing home had been cited for numerous
state and federal regulatory citations for issues related to prevention and care of pressure
sores, nutrition, and nursing care. See id. These care deficiencies were linked to complica-
tions contributing to the deaths. See id. at 291. The appellate court found that there was
sufficient evidence of the violations and affirmed the convictions. See id.
In Missouri v. Dale, 775 S.W. 2d 126 (Mo. 1989), three defendants (the corporate presi-
dent, vice president/director, and a spouse who acted as a supervisor) were convicted of
neglecting patients in a nursing care facility. See id. at 133-34. Inspections found the re-
sidents were not turned, kept dry, adequately fed or given water, and not properly given
their medications. See id. Evidence connected these failures to insufficient staffing levels.
See id. at 129. Evidence also established that records were falsely completed to indicate that
services were provided when in fact they had not been provided. See id.
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ties." In addition, at least one local District Attorneys office9 2 has
91. Examples, but by no means an exhaustive list of such cases, include the following:
The Oregon MFCU has brought cases for falsification of records, criminal mistreat-
ment, and criminal negligence in failing to provide adequate physical and medical care to
residents against nursing home owner/administrators, a director of nursing, and a corpo-
rate chain. These cases have resulted in loss of license (so that the defendant is no longer
permitted to practice in Oregon), jail time, substantial fines, and consent agreements. See,
e.g., Oregon v. Beverly Enterprises, No. 92-5-73 (Clackamas Co. Cir. Ct. May 7, 1992).
The Minnesota MFCU brought charges against Compassionate Home Care, Inc., a
home health agency, alleging that it intentionally neglected or knowingly permitted condi-
tions to exist that result in the neglect of a vulnerable adult. In 2000, the jury returned a
guilty verdict and sentenced the defendant to pay a $3,000 fine. See State v. Compassionate
Home Care, Inc., 639 N.W. 2d 393, 395 (Minn. App. 2002) (reversing conviction because
the district court "abused its discretion in instructing the jury and erred in responding to a
jury question without notifying counsel.").
The North Carolina MFCU brought a felony charge against Royal Crest Health Care
Center, Inc., a nursing home, for medical assistance provider fraud, and misdemeanor
charges for violating the N.C. Medical Care Commission Rules. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-
109(3) (1998). The case involved a Royal Crest resident who was admitted to the hospital
after developing stage IV decubitus ulcers. The nursing home falsified its records to show
that the ulcers which developed during the course of the resident's stay at the home were
present on admission. In a case arising out of the same facts the MFCU brought a felony
charge against Barbara Whittle, the director of nursing for Royal Crest, for malfeasance by
a corporate agent, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-254 (1993), and misdemeanor charges for violat-
ing the N.C. Medical Care Commission Rules, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-109(3) (1998). Both
were found guilty after a two week jury trial in 1993. Royal Crest was ordered to pay a
$40,000 fine. Barbara Whittle was sentenced to jail, although her misdemeanor conviction
was overturned and a new trial ordered for an erroneous jury instruction. See State v. Whit-
tle, 454 S.E. 2d 688, 692 (1995).
After years spent pursuing nurses and nurse aides in abuse and neglect cases, the
Florida MFCU discovered that such cases arise more often than not from corporate poli-
cies that put profit over patient care. In January of 1996 Sandestin Health Center, Inc., was
the first corporation in Florida to be convicted of patient abuse. After a grand jury re-
turned four felony counts of abuse by neglect of four of the center's patients the corpora-
tion pled guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of $10,000 on each count plus a five
percent surcharge to the statewide victim's fund and a ten percent surcharge to the elderly
victim's fund, and restitution to the victim's families. The case originated with the state's
protective services system, which referred the case after a local hospital stated that they
received a patient that was in the worse condition they had ever seen coming from a skilled
nursing facility. The resident had gangrene, pneumonia, septicemia, volume depletion, a
urinary tract infection that was so severe an emergency room doctor said she likely would
have died within a few hours had she not been brought to the hospital, several stage IV
decubitus ulcers and extremely poor hygiene. See Indictment, Florida v. Sandestin Health
Center, Inc. (Fl. 8thJudicial Circuit Ct. 1994).
The California MFCU, part of the state Attorney General's office, recently obtained a
felony conviction against a corporate entity under California's elder abuse statute for seri-
ous failures of care at one of Sun Healthcare Group, Inc.,'s California facilities. See Califor-
nia v. Rose Rehabilitation Center (SF 313-431A) (San Mateo Co. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2001).
The California MFCU also has pursued permanent injunctions and monetary penalties
against the parent entities that own facilities where serious failures of care occur. See Cali-
fornia v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc. (Ca Civ. No. 418519) (San Mateo Co. Super Ct. Oct.
3, 2001); California v. Moyle (01-CR-1977) (Riverside Co. Super Ct. Aug. 13, 2001). These
permanent injunctions and final judgments include comprehensive compliance provi-
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pursued a case against owners, corporate entities, and/or operators of
long term care facilities or chains. MFCU's, which often are housed
in the state AG's office, have the authority to investigate, and many
(but not all) have authority to prosecute abuse and neglect cases
against providers under criminal and/or civil statutes.9 3 Frequently,
MFCUs and other federal, state or local enforcement entities work
together on specific cases, or other issues.
A consumer protection approach would appear to provide an-
other potential, if underused, vehicle to address problems in long
term care. At least two state Attorneys General offices have used state
consumer protection or "mini FTC" laws successfully in cases against
long term care providers that did not deliver promised goods and
services.94
Federal Law Enforcement. Against this backdrop, and to respond to
these increased reports of problems, the Department of Justice insti-
tuted its Nursing Home Initiative and Elder Justice efforts.95 Given
the complexity of the issues, their increasing demographic signifi-
cance, and the substantial federal public health and fiscal interest, the
law enforcement approach, like otherefforts in this area, by necessity,
is multi-faceted.
The Department is comprised of numerous Divisions or compo-
nents. Those primarily involved in matters relating to long term care
sions, such as training, appointment of a compliance officer, quality assurance and internal
review systems, confidential disclosure programs, and written standards on quality related
measures. See id. The provisions in these cases are similar to those in HHS-OIG's corporate
integrity agreements, with the exception of there not being a monitor.
MFCUs and state Attorneys General have pursued cases involving failures of care in
other states as well, including Arkansas, Hawaii and Oklahoma. Moreover, in some states
the MFCUs and federal law enforcement have cooperated closely on failure of care mat-
ters, for example in Kentucky (see infra note 231), Louisiana, (see infra text following note
254) and Minnesota (see infra note 261), and such collaborative efforts are underway in
other states as well.
92. See California v. Guardian Post Acute Serv., Inc., No. 99-210398 (Santa Clara Co.
Superior Ct. May 26, 1999). In 1999, an Assistant District Attorney in Santa Clara County,
California, having gathered gruesome evidence about systemic neglect and abuses in
homes owned by Guardian Post Acute Services, Inc., indicted the entire chain. See id. See
alsoJason Baker, Investigation Leads to Charges Against Guardian Post Acute Services, Los GATOS
WEEKLY TiMES, 6/2/99, at http://www.metroactive.com/papers/los.gatos.weekly-times/
06.02.99/nursing-homes-9922.html. After lengthy negotiations the case was resolved with a
guilty plea and the exclusion of the two facilities most closely tied to the charges.
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2001).
94. See Oregon v. Tualatin Valley Health Care Ctr., No. CB 99-253 (D. Or. Mar. 2,
1999); Massachusetts v. MCK, Inc., No. 97-3634 (Suffolk Sup. Ct. 1997); Massachusetts v.
Horizon Healthcare, No. 98-5048C (Suffolk Sup. Ct. 1998).
95. These efforts included creation of the Department's Elder Justice web page, which
may be found at http://www.usdoj.gov under the heading Elder Justice.
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include three litigating divisions - the Civil, Criminal, and Civil Rights
Divisions; the Department's local offices - the United States Attor-
ney's Offices, the investigative entity - the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI); the grant making, research, and project-funding arm - the
Office of Justice Programs (and its Bureaus), the Office of Legal Pol-
icy (formerly the Office of Policy Development), the Office of Legisla-
tive Affairs, the Office of Public Affairs, and the Department's
leadership offices - the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General,
and Associate Attorney General's offices.9 6
In matters relating to health care enforcement the Department
works closely with the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). OIG's
Office of Investigations (01) and Office of Audit Services (OAS) con-
duct investigations and audits in health care related matters.97 Its Of-
fice of Counsel has authority to pursue a variety of remedies.98 The
Office of Evaluations and Inspections (OEI) - OIG's "think tank"
branch - conducts studies, and releases reports on a broad variety of
topics, including problems in quality of long term care.99
B. The Problems
Other articles in this Symposium issue of the Journal discuss vari-
ous challenges faced by the long term care industry, including labor
shortages that affect staffing, an influx of sicker patients, financial dis-
tress, and an increase in private lawsuits.' 00 The residents entrusted to
the care of that industry, who are the intended beneficiaries of the
government programs paying for most of that care, however, face con-
siderably more dire challenges in the face of abuse and neglect, in-
cluding injury, suffering, and sometimes death. 1'
96. For more information see the Department's organization chart, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/ under the heading Organizational Chart.
97. The Office of Inspector General and Office of Audit Services websites are available
at http://www.oig.hhs.gov.
98. The Office of Counsel's website is available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov under the
heading Office of Counsel.
99. The Office of Evaluations and Investigations website is available at http://www.oig.
hhs.gov under the heading Office of Evaluations and Inspections.
100. See Karl Pillemer and Mark Lachs, The Crisis in the Long-Term Care Workforce, 4 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y (2001); T. Shanahan, Statutory Limits on Punitive Damages in Nurs-
ing Home Negligence Tort Actions: Preventing the Collapse of the Private Nursing Home, 4 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y (2001).
101. Failure to provide requisite care may constitute, in my view, neglect, abuse, or both.
In many contexts, the terms abuse and neglect are terms of art. Their proper definitions
have been a topic of considerable dispute the resolution of which is beyond the scope of
this article.
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One obstacle in formulating the appropriate response to abuse
and neglect is the paucity of information about its scope: 1 2 Does it
occur in just a very few extreme outlier facilities? Is it the tip of the
tail on the bell shaped curve, or is it creeping up the slope into the
norm? How wide spread are significant problems? How many people
suffer or die as a result? And what is the human, social, and economic
cost of such problems?
Evaluation of the scope of the overall problem is critical to devel-
oping an overarching law enforcement response. In a single legal
case, however, what matters most is not the scope of the overall prob-
lem, but instead the evidence, relevant laws and regulations establish-
ing the standard of conduct, violations, applicable causes of action,
remedies, and the resources and expertise that can be employed in
investigating and pursuing the case. Greater understanding about the
scope of the problem, however, can help law enforcement establish
procedures, priorities, and practices in the area.
Concerns about quality of care in nursing homes have waxed and
waned for four decades with occasional reports of horrors and bursts
of public attention.10 Stark reports of quality problems led the Insti-
tute of Medicine (IOM) to examine the topic and issue a report in
1986 discussing the widespread problems and recommendations for
how to address them.10 4 Concerted efforts of numerous entities led to
the passage of the Nursing Home Reform Act in 1987 (Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, or OBRA '87),105 which enhanced
the survey system, quality of care and quality of life standards, and the
administrative enforcement system.10 6 The statute and many of the
ensuing regulations took a more (although not entirely) outcome-
based approach than previously had been the case, placing the em-
phasis on nursing homes finding ways to reach the desired outcomes
- quality of care and life.10 7
Although no national data on abuse and neglect in residential
care facilities other than nursing homes have been collected, residents
of such facilities share many of the same risk factors that place all
elders and disabled persons at greater risk for being abused and ne-
102. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ELDER
JUSTICE: MED. FORENSIC ISSUES RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT, at http://www.usdoj.gov.
103. See supra note 4.
104. See IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE, supra note 3.
105. Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9302(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 1982 (1986) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320, 1395 - 1397 (2001).
106. See id.
107. See id.
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glected in other settings as well.'0 8 These risk factors include chronic
disease and significant disabilities,' 0 9 particularly high levels of cogni-
tive impairment or other mental health conditions, 1 0 certain types of
behavioral problems," 1 social isolation, 12 and poverty.11 3
Viewed in almost any light, existing reports on the quality of long
term care are troubling. The problems of residential care settings
other than nursing homes have not been well studied or quantified.
114
What little we know, however, indicates the same types of problems as
in other types of long term care. In one study fifteen percent of the
residential care facility staff interviewed reported witnessing other
staff engage in some form of abuse."15 Long term care ombudsmen
report that physical abuse is one of the top five types of complaints
registered with them.' 1 6 And several studies have suggested problems
of inadequate care and neglect.'1 7 The challenges faced by these
types of facilities will only increase as demand rises, and the care
needs of the residents grow increasingly complex." 8
108. See Elder Abuse in Residential Long-Term Care, supra note 24, at 7.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1, 6-7.
115. See id. at 16. Based on telephone interviews with staff, who reported witnessing
other staff engage in verbal abuse, or punishment such as withholding food, excessive use
of physical restraints, or isolating difficult residents.
116. Administration on Aging data and National Ombudsman Resource Center, indicat-
ing that physical abuse was one of the top five complaints registered with long term care
ombudsman in both residential care settings as well as nursing homes. See Admin. on Ag-
ing, The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study; Final Report, 1998, available at http://
www.aoa.dhhs.gov/abuse/report. Ombudsmen are advocates who address complaints for
residents in assisted living facilities. Of the 121,686 complaints handled by long term care
ombudsman in 1998, an estimated 82% were in nursing home settings. Among the re-
maining 17% arising in residential care settings, physical abuse was one of the top five
complaints. See id.
117. See Elder Abuse in Residential Long-Term Care, supra note 24, at 24.
118. See id. Compared to nursing home residents, residential care facility residents may
face more medication errors, high rates of psychotropic drug use, poor management of
behavior problems among Alzheimers patients and other residents with dementia, and
poorer functional outcomes. See id. However, the alternatives for many of these individuals
often are limited to moving into a nursing home. Many people are so terrified of nursing
homes that they would rather stay in a setting where they are abused or neglected - indeed
some would choose to die - rather than go to a nursing home. See ThomasJ. Mattimore, et
al., Surrogate and Physician Understanding of Patients' Preferences for Living Permanently in Nurs-
ing Homes, 45J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'v 7, 7 (1997) (reporting that 30% of the respondents
said they would "rather die" than live permanently in a nursing home) [hereinafter
Mattimore].
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The reported problems in nursing homes are better defined. In
a ground-breaking study, 36% of the nursing home nursing and aid
staff surveyed reported that they had witnessed at least one incident of
physical abuse during the preceding twelve months and ten percent
reported that they had themselves committed physical abuse." 9 More
recent data appear to bear out these numbers, including reports that
almost one third of all .nursing homes are cited for abuse-related defi-
ciencies; 20 that about one third to one quarter of nursing homes sur-
veyed provide seriously deficient or potentially life-threatening
care;' 2 ' that 50% to 90% of all nursing homes are understaffed; 122
that understaffing harms residents; 123 that federal and state oversight
is insufficient;'12 and that older people who have been abused or ne-
glected die sooner than those who have not been similarly abused or
neglected, even controlling for other underlying conditions. 125
These reports illustrate a stark truth: too many human beings
who are utterly dependent on their caretakers are not fed, bathed,
cleaned, turned, or positioned; they do not receive proper medica-
tion, clean sheets, wound care, treatment, or the assistance they need
119. See Karl Pillemer and David Moore, Highlights from a Study of Abuse of Patients in
Nursing Homes, 2 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 5, 5-30 (1990). The study, which surveyed
nursing home personnel in one state, also found that 81% of staff reported that they had
observed and 40% that they had engaged in at least one incident of psychological abuse
during the same 12 month period. See id.
120. See Abuse of Residents, supra note 5 at i.
121. See 1998 GAO Report, supra note 4, at 2.
122. See STAFFING RATIOS, supra note 6, at E.S.-5.
123. See id. See also Press Release, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, New
Analysis Confirms Direct Link Between Nurse Staffing and Patient Complications and
Deaths in Hospitals (May 29, 2002).
124. See 1998 GAO Report, supra note 4, at 2. The GAO reported that federal and state
oversight was insufficient, and that complaint investigation and enforcement were not used
effectively to assure adequate quality. See id. In addition, with respect to the entire country,
the GAO concluded that one quarter of all nursing homes have serious and oft-repeated
deficiencies that result in immediate jeopardy or actual harm to residents, among other
things by failing to prevent pressure sores, accidents, and failing to assess resident needs
and provide proper care. See id.
125. See Lachs et al., The Mortality of Elder Mistreatment, 280 JAMA 428, 428-32 (1999).
This study - one of the few in this area - reaches the stark conclusion that abuse and
neglect significantly shorten the older victim's life, even when controlling for all other
variables. Incidents of mistreatment that many would perceive as minor can have a
debilitating impact on the older victim. A single episode of victimization can "tip over" an
otherwise productive, self-sufficient older person's life. In other words, because older vic-
tims usually have fewer support systems and reserves (physical, psychological and eco-
nomic) the impact of abuse and neglect is magnified. Thus, a single incident of
mistreatment is more likely to trigger a downward spiral leading to loss of independence,
serious complicating illness, and even death. See id.
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
with the activities of daily living (ADLs). 1 26 As a result, these vulnera-
ble people too often endure unnecessary illness, injury, suffering, and
premature death, deprived not only of health and sometimes life, but
also of dignity and the joy in living. Those who are mistreated cannot
simply get up and move to another facility. Often, they cannot give
voice to their suffering or to their wishes. And even if they can, they
may fear retaliation from those on whom they are dependent.
A long term care system with these types of problems is one that
demands the prompt, thoughtful and substantial attention of all rele-
vant entities, including law enforcement.
C. The Growing Need For Long Term Care
Of the great social and family issues facing us today, few are as
complex or as pressing as the question of how we will care for our
aging population. It is well documented that we are on the cusp of a
profound demographic shift.12 7 As the baby boomers age and medi-
cal advances allow us to live longer, the number of Americans over 65
will approximately double to 70 million by 2030.128 During the same
period it is estimated that the number of those in need of long term
care will increase from 7 to 14 million, and those requiring nursing
home or equivalent levels of care will increase from about 1.6 million
to 6.6 million. 129 Although the number actually in a nursing home at
any given time is about 1.6 million, more than 2.9 million Americans
resided in a nursing home for at least some part of 2000.130 Already,
those 85 and older are the fastest growing age group, closely followed
by those 100 and older. 13 1 It is almost impossible to overstate the im-
pact of these trends on all aspects of our families and society.
Most of us already have been or soon will be faced with navigating
the options and obstacles inherent in finding or planning for quality
long term care - either for ourselves or for family and friends. At the
same time as the aging population and the need for long term care is
126. These are the types of failures that give rise to the sort of problems noted by the
surveyors in the excerpts that begin this piece.
127. See NURSING HOME CONDITIONS, supra note 22, at 5-6
128. See Administrative on Aging, Older Americans: 2000, at http://www.aoa.gov/aoa/
stats/profile/default.html.
129. See AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ASSOC., FACTS AND TRENDS: THE NURSING FACILITY
SOURCEBOOK 15 (2001).
130. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, NURSING HOME DATA COMPEN-
DIUM ii (2000) [hereinafter DATA COMPENDIUM]..The data compendium provides data in
figures and tables on all residents in Medicare and Medicaid certified homes in the United
States.
131. See Elder Abuse in Residential Long-Term Care, supra note 24 at 2.
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surging, the number of those who traditionally have fulfilled the care
giver role is decreasing.
132
In what has been called the "longevity paradox,"133 incredible ad-
vances in modern medicine allow us to live longer, but we have failed
to assign equal importance to developing and funding the corre-
sponding mechanisms that will assure adequate care to those who
need it. Unless we embrace this challenge, the consequences will be
dire - and disproportionately borne by our most vulnerable citizens.
Given this scenario, we must strategically contemplate, develop, and
adequately support an appropriate overall response, that includes an
adequate law enforcement component.
D. The Industry
1. Nursing Homes
On any particular day, about 1.6 million people live in about
17,000 nursing homes in this country, but over the course of a year,
almost 3 million people will have resided in a nursing home for some
period of time."'
In 2000 about 16,800 facilities were certified to participate in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs. 1 5 Most homes participate in both
programs.1 3 6 Seven percent participate in Medicare only and 15 per-
cent participate in Medicaid only.1 37 About 65 percent of nursing
homes operate on a for profit basis, 28 percent are not-for-profit, and
the remaining seven percent are public entities.'38 Nursing homes
receive about $ 40 billion in federal dollars a year, and another $ 20
billion through the states.1 39 Occupancy rates for nursing homes have
132. See Deborah Stone, Care and Trembling, Am. PROSPECr 61 (Apr./May 1999), available
at 1999 WL 3720366. Increasing numbers of women are in the work force, families are
more geographically scattered than in previous generations, and, as the country ages, the
number of people traditionally in the "caretaker age range" is decreasing. Of course, other
types of caregivers may well step in to fill this void. See Mary Dellman-Jenkins et al., Young
Adult Children and Grandchildren in Primary Caregiver Roles to Older Relatives and their Service
Needs, 49 FAMILY RELATIONS 2, 2-4 (2000), available at 2000 WL 11794339.
133. SeeJoseph F. Coughlin, Technology Needs of Aging Boomers, IssuEs SC!. & TECH. ON-
LINE (Fall 1999) 5, at http://www.bob.nap.edu/issues/16.1/coughlin.htm.
134. See DATA COMPENDIUM, supra note 130, at ii. More than 2.9 million Americans re-
sided in nursing homes for at least some part of 2000. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at iii.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
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been decreasing slowly since 1996, while the care needs of residents
have been increasing.
1 40
Significant data sources exist that provide a picture of many dif-
ferent aspects of nursing homes and their residents. The Minimum
Data Set (MDS) (a resident assessment and facility reimbursement
tool), and OSCAR, (survey information), contain gargantuan
amounts of information that increasingly are being analyzed to elicit
information about nursing home residents, individual facilities, and
chains, as well as state-wide and national trends. For example, it is
possible to see how a particular nursing home fares in a particular
area (for example prevalence of decubitus ulcers and other related
factors) compared to other homes in that chain, in that state, or
nationally. 141
In recent years, the nursing home industry has been in financial
straights, with the majority of the largest chains and many smaller en-
tities forced to file for bankruptcy.1 42 The reasons for the financial
crisis are much in dispute, 14 and will not be resolved here, but there
are significant potential fiscal and public health implications of these
bankruptcy actions, demanding the attention and coordination of
myriad federal and state entities.
Amidst reports of resource problems in long term care and the
diversity of views on why they plague this industry, there are facilities
today that provide great care with existing resources.144 Understanding
these entities' success might be a valuable and important effort for
others to undertake.
2. Residential Care Facilities
In addition to the 1.6 million people in nursing homes, nearly
one million additional people live in an estimated 45,000 residential
care facilities, and their number is reportedly on the rise. 14 5 These
entities variously go by some thirty different names (including assisted
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., Nursing Home Compare (last modified 3/21/2002) <http://www.medicare.
gov/NHCompare/home.asp>.
142. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
143. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AGGREGATE MEDICARE PAYMENTS ARE ADEQUATE
DESPITE BANKRUPTCIES, (GAO/T-HEHS-00-192)(2000); Debra Sparks, Nursing Homes: On
the Sick List, Bus. WEEK, July 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 8228378.
144. See Diane C. Lade, Add Human Touch: An Alternative Philosophy Says it's Time to
Change the Culture of Nursing Homes, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL
9170090; The Wellspring Program, visited 1/31/2001, <http://www.wellspringis.org>.
145. See Elder Abuse in Residential Long-Term Care, supra note 24, at 1.
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living facilities, board and care homes, congregate living, personal
care homes, and homes for the aged).' 46
Generally, these types of facilities are non-medical, community-
based residential settings, housing two or more unrelated adults. 4 7
They typically provide some services, such as meals, medication super-
vision, activities, transportation and assistance with the activities of
daily living (such as bathing, dressing, toileting, etc.).148 As noted
above, much less is known about residential care facilities than about
nursing homes. 14' Unfortunately, there are many impediments to col-
lecting such information, including the absence of consistent defini-
tions, standards and reporting requirements. 5 ' In addition, the level
of medical services provided in such circumstances range from some-
one who receives a check at the YMCA, to private home settings, to a
specially-designated wing, of a nursing home.1
5 1
Some states have promulgated laws and/or regulations governing
and setting forth a standard of conduct for residential care facili-
ties. 152 Others have not. The same is true for oversight and enforce-
ment.153 These types of entities vary tremendously, and there is little
uniformity from state-to-state in how they are defined, regulated and
overseen. Most are not subject to federal regulation or oversight.' 54
Often, the state entities charged with oversight of such providers al-
ready have stretched their available resources. Thus, even where re-
quirements exist, as a practical matter, oversight nonetheless may be
limited.
3. Other Types of Facilities
Long term care is provided in many settings. In addition to the
900,000 - 1 million residential care facility residents discussed above, it
is estimated that another 1.5 million people reside in independent
apartments with some services, about 625,000 live in retirement com-
munities offering all levels of care depending on need, tens of
146. See id.
147. See id. at 20.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 19-20.
151. See id. at 20.
152. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r §§ 400-401 (1997).
153. See U.S. GEN. Accr. OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE: CONSUMER PROTECTION AND QUALITY-
OF-CARE ISSUES IN ASSISTED LIVING 4 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 GAO Report].
154. See 1997 GAO Report, supra note 153, at 4-5; U.S. Senate Special Committee on
Aging, Hearing, Shopping for Assisted Living: What Consumers Need to Make the Best
Buy, 4/26/99, at http://aging.senate.gov/hr31ka.htm.
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thousands live in adult foster care, and an estimated six million chron-
ically ill and disabled adults receive care at home.155 The lines among
categories of providers and the types of residents they serve have
blurred. Today's assisted living facilities resemble the nursing homes
of a decade ago.' 56 Consumers' assumptions, whether accurate or
not, also influence which types of long term care (including home
care or the lack of it) are used. 15 7
Although there rarely is federal jurisdiction over these types of
care when not federally funded, it nevertheless is important, when dis-
cussing long term care, to examine not only nursing homes, and not
only assisted living or residential care, but the entire landscape of long
term care options. A comprehensive and interrelated approach is
necessary because the diverse and constantly shifting modalities of
providing care are inextricably linked. Today's nursing homes serve a
different population than they did a decade ago.15 Residents are
sicker.'59 Their stays are shorter. 6 ° (The refrain is "quicker and
sicker.")' 6 ' These residents need more complex and more costly
care. 162 They need more supplies and equipment. They require
more frequent care planning. They require more staff, who in turn
need more training- issues at the core of failure of care problems.
III. PROSECUTING FEDERAL CASES RELATING TO FAILURES OF
LONG TERM CARE
16 3
In recent years the Department of Justice has pursued an increas-
ing number of cases involving abuse and neglect in long term care
155. SeeJoseph P. Shapiro, Growing Old in a Good Home, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May
21, 2001, at 56, available at 2001 WL 6320370. Caring for growing numbers of older and
frail people at home also presents increasing challenges, risks of abuse and neglect, enor-
mous human and economic demands on (causing ensuing stress of) care givers. The
mechanisms we develop for providing care to people in their homes and the fear of long
term care that may keep people in an in appropriate home care environment also are
important to the discussion about the crisis in long term care. These issues are only flag-
ged, not discussed, in this paper.
156. See Susan Tresch Fienberg, Time for a New Approach to Residential Care, HEALrTHCARE
REv., Jan. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 30204033.
157. See Maureen Dixon, An Alternative to Nursing Homes, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 2000, 2000
WL 6483634. See also supra note 118.
158. SeeJosEPH OUSLANDER ET AL., MEDICAL CARE IN THE NURSING HOME 112 (2d 1997).
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. The discussion in this article of cases pursued by the Department of Justice
includes no attorney-client privileged, work product protected, or otherwise privileged or
protected information.
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facilities, and particularly, nursing homes. There is no federal civil or
criminal abuse and neglect statute that makes failures of care actiona-
ble per se. But traditional theories of health care fraud enforcement
more recently have been imported to cases involving failures in long
term care. The number of these cases has been on the rise. In pursu-
ing federal criminal, civil, and civil rights cases to redress failures in
long term care, the Department's object - at each step - is to balance
the law enforcement and public health goals. Or, said another way, to
pursue the cases in such a way that they deter future wrongdoing,
recoup lost funds, protect residents, and improve care.
A. Civil Cases
The majority of the Department's cases to date alleging abuse
and neglect in residential care settings (failures of basic care leading
to profound malnutrition, dehydration, pressure ulcers, scalding, and
other illness, injury or death) have been pursued under the civil False
Claims Act, a financial fraud statute.' 6 4 Originally enacted after the
Civil War to redress war profiteering, 165 the Act provides a cause of
action, treble damages, and penalties where a "person" (either an in-
dividual or entity) knowingly submits, or causes to be submitted to the
United States, a false claim for payment.166 The FCA also permits pri-
vate citizens, known as "relators," to file suit on behalf of the United
States (these are called qui tam actions). 67 Once a relator or
whistleblower has filed a qui tam action, the United States has options,
including "intervening in" and taking over the case or "declining" it,
and permitting the relator to proceed. 168 The statute requires that
the case remain under seal for 60 days (or longer if the Court extends
the period for good cause) to give the United States an opportunity to
164. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988). Under the federal civil False Claims Act, an individual or
entity that makes false claims or statements or causes false claims and statements to be
made to the United States is liable for treble damages and penalties of $5000 - $10,000 per
false claim. Liability under the false claims act occurs when a person:
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of
the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval; (2) makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or state-
ment to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; [or]
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim
allowed or paid.
Id.
165. See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
166. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988).
167. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b) (1) (1988).
168. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b) (2) (1988).
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investigate to determine how to proceed. 6 The FCA has been the
government's primary tool in fighting health care fraud as well as
other types of fraud (such as defense procurement fraud). 7
Moreover, the threat to government health care programs from
continuing financial fraud and abuse will only be accentuated by the
sharp increase in demand on those programs as the number of benefi-
ciaries grows. Despite progress in anti-fraud measures, the estimated
$13 billion lost yearly by the federal healthcare programs because of
fraud harms not only present and future beneficiaries (older, dis-
abled, and impoverished Americans - sooner or later, almost all of
us), but the long term care system itself.1 71 It also harms honest long
term care providers who take compliance seriously, by decreasing the
potential pool of funds as demand grows, necessitating more cutbacks
on reimbursement, increasing scrutiny of claims, and harming the in-
dustry's reputation. Moreover, beneficiaries pay a very real price for
health care fraud in the amount of their copayments and contribu-
tions. In short, those who defraud Medicare and Medicaid steal from
all those who contribute to and rely on those programs.
The Department's health care fraud efforts, in partnership with
other federal and state enforcement agencies, resulted in approxi-
mately $1.3 billion in judgments, settlements and administrative impo-
sitions in health care fraud proceedings and cases in fiscal year
2000.172 Of that amount, more than $717 million was collected and
returned to various state and federal health care programs, with $577
million returned to the Medicare Trust Fund.17' These funds now
can be used properly - to fund the requisite care for those who need
it.
For the first time in 1996, and on several occasions since then,
the United States has pursued "failure of care" cases under the False
Claims Act premised on providers' knowingly billing for goods or ser-
vices that were non-existent, worthless, or grossly deficient. 174
169. See id.
170. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986).
171. See Testimony of Lewis Morris before the Senate Special Committee on Aging on
Medicare Enforcement Actions: The Government's Anti-Fraud Efforts, July 26, 2001 at
http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/index.htm.
172. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Recovers Record 1.6 Billion in
Fraud Payments (Nov. 14, 2001).
173. See id.
174. See United States v. GMS Management-Tucker, Inc., No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21,
1996) (Geri-Med); United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Ctr. of Okla., 945 F.
Supp. 1485 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
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1. The Theories
Failure of care cases stand for the unexceptional proposition that
an entity may not bill the government for nonexistent, worthless, or
grossly substandard products or services.' 7 5 A failure of care case may
be actionable under one or more of several alternative False Claims
Act theories, including billing for nonexistent or worthless services,
submitting express false certifications, false statements or false docu-
ments, and billing for goods or services that violate a statutory, regula-
tory or contractual provision with a nexus to payment.'
76
Most failure of care cases will involve worthless or nonexistent
services, false statements or documents, and often an express false cer-
tification. 1 77 Those few cases that do not involve either may fit com-
fortably within the third theory - billing for goods or services that
violate a statutory, regulatory or contractual provision with a nexus to
payment.
178
The submission of claims for items or services that are not what
they purport to be, or that are not those for which the government
bargained, can render such claims, if made with the requisite scienter,
false. 17' A worthless services claim is the archetypical FCA case - the
government paid for a product or service that was not provided.'80
Disclosures of billing for nonexistent or worthless goods during the
Civil War prompted Congress to enact the False Claims Act in the first
place. 8' The viability of the nonexistent or worthless goods and ser-
vices theory consistently has been recognized.' 82
175. See United States ex rel. Lee v. Smithkline Beecham, Inc., 245 F. 3d 1048, 1053 (9th
Cir. 2001).
176. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1943); United States v.
NHC Health Care Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056-57 (W.D. Mo. 2001); Aranda, 945 F.
Supp. at 1488; United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 1994).
177. See NHC Health Care Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1056-57; United States v. Aerodex,
Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 1973); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,
176 F.3d 776, 793 (4th Cir. 1999).
178. See Marcus, 317 U.S. at 543-44; United States ex rel. Wright v. Cleo Wallace Ctr., 132
F. Supp. 2d 913, 926 (D. Colo. 2000); United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1526 (11 th
Cir. 1988); General Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d at 777.
179. See Aerodex, 469 F.2d at 1007-08; United States ex rel. Oliver v. The Gyro House, 2001
WAL 312378 (9th Cir. 2001).
180. See NHC Health Care, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1056-57; United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S.
595, 599 (1958).
181. See McNinch, 356 U.S. at 599.
182. See Lee, 245 F. 3d at 1053; United States ex rel. Compton v. Midwest Specialties, Inc.,
142 F.3d 296, 302 (6th Cir. 1998); Aerodex, 469 F.2d at 1007-08; and NHC Health Care, 163 F.
Supp. 2d at 1056 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
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United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss,'8 3 affirmed the viability of non-
existent and worthless services claims (despite concluding that de-
fendants were not liable on other grounds).84 The Mikes court set
forth that "[a] worthless services claim asserts that the knowing re-
quest of federal reimbursement for a procedure with no medical value
violates the Act irrespective of any certification."' 85 It went on to cite
approvingly to United State ex rel. Lee v. Smithkline Beecham, Inc.,' 86 in
which the court reversed and remanded, noting that the district court
had "overlooked the allegations... that supported a different theory -
that Smithkline violated the FCA by seeking and receiving payment
for medically worthless tests."' 8 7 In Mikes, which also involved alleg-
edly worthless tests, the court found no FCA violation, not because
worthless services are not actionable, but on the ground that the rela-
tor, as a matter of law, could not prove knowledge.188 The Mikes court
cited Lee approvingly, noting:
As the Ninth Circuit explained, "[i]n an appropriate case,
knowingly billing for worthless services or recklessly doing so
with deliberate ignorance may be actionable under § 3729
[of the False Claims Act], regardless of any false certification
conduct."'8 9
The Mikes court went on to conclude that a worthless services
claim "is effectively derivative of an allegation that a claim is factually
false because it seeks reimbursement for a service not provided.... In
a worthless services claim, the performance of the service is so defi-
cient that for all practical purposes it is the equivalent to no perform-
ance at all." ' °
In the failure of care case most directly on point, United States v.
NHC Health Care Corp., alleging that severe staff shortages led to the
death of two residents, the court expanded on this, noting:
[I] t is likely that implied certification is not relevant herein
because the Defendants are not being sued simply for violat-
ing the standard of care with regard to Residents 1 and 2.
[fn3] Rather, Defendants are being sued because they alleg-
edly failed to provide the services that they billed for. No cer-
183. 2001 WL 1628486 (2d Cir. 2001).
184. See id. at *13.
185. Id.
186. 245 F. 3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2001).
187. Id. at 1053.
188. See id.
189. Mikes, 2001 WL 1628486 at *13 (quoting Lee, 245 F. 3d at 1053).
190. Id. at *13.
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tification, implied or otherwise, is necessary when the
liability stems from the Defendants' activities of billing for
procedures which they did not perform. This would plainly
constitute fraud. The difficulty in proving that Defendants
committed such a fraud lies in the per diem billing system
utilized under Medicare/Medicaid. Obviously, if NHC billed
the Government $4 for turning Resident 1 on July 18, 1998,
but in fact no one actually performed the task, a clear cut
case of fraudulent billing would be presented. However, we
are not blessed with such pristine circumstances. NHC billed
the Medicare/Medicaid programs for the over-all care of
each of these residents on a per diem basis. As previously
stated by this Court, in so doing NHC agreed to provide "the
quality of care which promotes the maintenance and the en-
hancement of the quality of life." [fn4] Id. at 1153. At some
very blurry point, a provider of care can cease to maintain
this standard by failing to perform the minimum necessary
care activities required to promote the patient's quality of
life. When the provider reaches that point, and still presents
claims for reimbursement to Medicare, the provider has sim-
ply committed fraud against the United States. Whether the
Government has demonstrated that a factual dispute re-
mains as to whether NHC crossed into this admittedly grey
area, is the proper focus of this Order.' 9 '
In a nonexistent or worthless services claim, a determination of
falsity may turn on the value of the provided services. A showing that
the defendant violated statutory or regulatory standards of care is
some, though not necessarily per se, evidence, of the worthlessness of
the services.' 92 The relevant standards of care could include those
standards that require "sufficient numbers" of staff, appropriate assis-
tance with the activities of daily living (bathing, toileting, ambulating,
eating), appropriate steps to prevent bedsores, falls, unexplained
weight loss and dehydration, appropriate range of motion and other
exercises, and appropriate management of medication. 193 While
these may sound like technical requirements, violation of these re-
quirements often leads to rapid decline, illness, injury, suffering, and
even death. Such violations also may frequently lead to significant ad-
ditional costs borne by the resident, the resident's family, the govern-
191. NHC Health Care, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 & n.3 & 4.
192. See id.
193. For an example of an independent, non-governmental standard of care, see
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POL'Y RESEARCH, Treatment of Pressure Ulcers, Clinical Practice Guide-
line No. 15, 95-0652 (Dec. 1995), in CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR THE PREDICTION,
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF PRESSURE ULCERS.
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ment and the taxpayers as the result of unnecessary hospitalizations
and emergency or long term care.
Additional evidence of the worthlessness or deficiency of particu-
lar services could include a showing that the care provided also vio-
lated an independent non-governmental standard or by comparing
the actual services provided to those set out in a resident's care
plan.194 It is likely that many failure of care cases will continue to
involve nonexistent or worthless services claims.
As a condition to obtaining payment, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the states require providers to sign
various forms, several of which contain certifications. The False
Claims Act also is implicated, and an express false certification exists,
where a facility certifies, as a condition of payment, that it has com-
plied with the regulations and statutes governing the care provided,
when in fact it has knowledge that it has not done so.1" 5 It is reasona-
ble for the government to require certifications on claim forms to im-
plement and promote accountability with respect to the Medicare
statute. 1
9 6
In a third type of False Claims Act case, courts have found the
violation of a statute, regulation, or contract provision with a nexus to
payment to be sufficient to establish FCA liability, even absent an ex-
press certification and where services existed and were not entirely
worthless.1 97 Some parties and courts have used the short-hand term
"implied certification" to describe such cases, although the term also
has led to some confusion about what, precisely, is meant.' 98 In each
case the presentment of the claim at issue falsely represents entitle-
ment to payment that the violation of the other statute, regulation or
provision forfeited.'99
194. See id. See also United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding
liability under the False Claims Act for services that were outlined in care plans but never
performed).
195. See Harrison v. Westinghouse, 176 F.3d 776, 793 (4th Cir. 1999).
196. See Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 51 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
830 (1975).
197. Cf United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976) (goods did not conform to
contract specifications); United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1970) (falsity depends on violation of Department of
Agriculture regulations); Faulk v. United States, 198 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1952) (defendant
used false labels in providing substandard milk).
198. See, e.g., United States ex reL Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Ctr. of Okla., 945 F.
Supp. 1485, 1488 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
199. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 41 F. Supp. 197, 210 (W.D. Pa. 1941); Shaw
v. AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 531 (10th Cir. 2000).
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In enacting the Nursing Home Reform Act20 0 Congress sought to
enact a statutory and regulatory scheme that was sufficiently compre-
hensive in its requirements to assure the well-being of vulnerable nurs-
ing home residents. 20 1 Thus, when providers bill for care that not
only violates the relevant requirements, but is so inadequate that it
harms or kills residents instead of caring for them, such violations go
right to the core of the statutory and regulatory scheme. At the heart
of the Medicare and Medicaid programs is the proposition that prov-
iders are being paid from public funds to take care of residents in the
manner and in accordance with the standards specified by those
programs.
The NHC court recognized this critical nexus between care and
payment. Although NHC turned on a worthless services claim, the case
includes language relevant to the statutory/regulatory violation the-
ory.20 2 The court concluded that the government's allegations con-
cerning the residents' pressure sores, weight loss, and unnecessary
pain were violations "at the heart" of the provider agreement, stating:
This Court has previously held that the standard of care is
indeed at the heart of the agreement between the parties.
See NHC, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 ("When caring for the
infirmed it is not the end product result that is crucial, it is
the dignity and quality of life provided through the care pro-
cess.") To the extent that implied certification is proper in
healthcare cases, the facts of this case fit the definition set
forth by previous case law .... [FN 4] While the court con-
ceded that this is an amorphous standard, it is not a standard
without meaning .... At some point the care rendered to a
patient can be so lacking that the provider has simply failed
to adhere to the standards it agreed to abide by and has thus
committed a fraud.20 3
The only other court to explicitly consider the government's
False Claims Act failure of care theory reached a similar conclusion. 20 4
In U.S. ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Centers, the United States
alleged that children in a psychiatric hospital suffered serious injury
and sexual abuse as the result of the facility's failure to conform to
Medicaid program standards. 2 5 The Aranda court concluded, with-
200. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (Medicare stan-
dards) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (Medicaid standards)).
201. See id.
202. See NHC Health Care, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
203. Id. at 1154-56 & n.4.
204. See Aranda, 945 F. Supp. 1485, 1488.
205. See id.
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out finding any express false certifications, that compliance with the
requisite standards of care was a condition of participation and an
essential prerequisite to payments from the program. 20 6 The court
relied on the Medicaid participation requirements as the standard of
care, violation of which was actionable under the FCA.2 °7
It is worth noting with respect to all types of failure of care cases
that facilities are on legal notice of all statutes and properly issued
regulations, and may therefore be held to have knowledge of when
their services fall below the minimum standard of care.208 In addi-
tion, although not an element necessary to prove in any failure of care
case, it is likely that most will involve bad outcomes as well as falsity, as
illustrated by the cases below. Indeed, each of the cases pursued by
the Department to date has involved egregious and/or systemic fail-
ures of care, and serious harm, suffering, and/or death of one or
more residents.20 9
2. The Cases
a. United States v. GMS Management-Tucker (Geri-Med)
The first failure of care nursing home case pursued under the
False Claims Act was set in motion when an elderly man was admitted
to a Philadelphia hospital in early 1994.21° The man was malnour-
ished, dehydrated, anemic, in severe pain, and had approximately 26
decubitus ulcers, all of which were necrotic and malodorous, and
most of which were at stage IV level.211 One ulcer on his hip was the
size of a grapefruit and to the bone, and another was so bad that it
had more or less rotted away his shoulder.212 In addition, his right leg
was gangrenous and the toes on his left foot were necrotic and in the
process of falling off.2 13 The emergency room staff were so troubled
by what they saw that they called the long term care ombudsman who
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See Heckler v. Community Health Serv., 467 U.S. 51, 63-64 (1984) (provider has an
affirmative duty to be familiar with Medicare requirements).
209. See NHC Health Care, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1051-53. Although this is not an element
that needs to be proven to establish a cause of action under the False Claims Act, the cases
pursued to date involved such egregious wrongdoing and systemic failures of care, that in
each case such harm to or death of residents occurred. See id.
210. See United States v. GMS Management-Tucker, Inc., No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21,
1996) (Ceri-Med). See also David Hoffman, The Role of the Federal Government in Ensuring Qual-
ity of Care in Long-Term Care Facilities, 6 ANN. HEALTH L. 147, 147 (1997) (discussing the
Geri-Med case in greater depth) [hereinafter Hoffman].
211. See Hoffman, supra note 210, at 147-49.
212. See id.
213. See id.
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in turn contacted Pennsylvania Attorney General's office which made
a video tape showing the man's wounds and general condition. 2 4 At
the time, however, the Attorney General's office did not have an ade-
quate cause of action under state law to pursue the case. 215
The case also was brought to the attention of an Assistant United
States Attorney in Philadelphia.216 The ensuing investigation revealed
that Tucker House, where the victim had been a resident, had failed
to provide the basic care required by law and regulation. 217 As a result
of the facility's systemic failure to provide necessary care other re-
sidents also suffered from unnecessary pressure sores, weight loss,
malnutrition, and out-of-control blood sugars. 2 8 Like the man who
triggered the investigation, other residents eventually died from the
harm they suffered.219 The U.S. Attorney's Office expanded the inves-
tigation to include not only Tucker House but also other facilities
owned by the same owner, Geri-Med, a chain with a history of non-
compliance. 220 The investigation indicated that significant failure of
care problems plagued not only Tucker House, but numerous facili-
ties in the chain.221
The Geri-Med case was settled for $575,000 in False Claims Act
damages - an amount based on the monies the facility received for
the care of the residents who were harmed by the facilities' failures. 222
In addition, and perhaps more significantly, the United States con-
sulted with a group of medical experts to assist in the development of
protocols for non-monetary relief calculated to protect residents and
improve care in the future. These measures were embodied in a con-
sent judgment with two primary components: (1) imposition of a
temporary-independent monitor (who reported to the United States
and was paid by Geri-Med) whose role it was to oversee the chain's
operations and make recommendations for improvement, and (2)
specific protocols that Geri-Med was required to implement in its facil-
ities that were intended to improve care, particularly in problem areas
214. See id.
215. Since then, state law has been supplemented and Pennsylvania now has a criminal
cause of action for abuse of a care-dependent individual. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2713
(2001).
216. See Hoffman, supra note 210, at 148.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See Consent Order 6, GMS Management-Tucker, No. 96-1271.
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such as wound care, diabetes management, weight loss, and the moni-
toring of lab values.223
The consent judgment covered not only Tucker House, but also
Geri-Med's other 17 facilities, although the most stringent protocols
applied to Tucker House and the eight other facilities with the most
problematic compliance records. 224 The consent judgment also re-
quired Geri-Med to write letters of apology to the families of three of
the victims of Geri-Med's wrongdoing.225
b. United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Ctr. of
Oklahoma
In 1996, the same year Geri-Med was settled, a court for the first
time considered and affirmed the viability of pursuing a False Claims
Act case under a failure of care theory.22 6 As noted above, this case
involved a psychiatric facility that, instead of providing adequate treat-
ment for troubled adolescent boys, permitted an environment where
boys ages eight through eleven were regularly sexually abused. The
defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action and that the quality of care requirements were too
vague to be enforced. 227 The court disagreed, ruling:
It may be easier for a maker of widgets to determine its prod-
uct meets contract specifications than for a hospital to deter-
mine whether its services meet "professionally recognized
standards of health care." In the Court's view, however, a
problem of measurement should not pose a bar to pursuing
a FCA claim against a provider of substandard health care
services under appropriate circumstances.2 2 8
The court noted that "the risk of harm was sufficiently unreasonable,
and the risks of harm known by [the facility] were sufficiently fre-
quent and blatant" that the provider's decision to bill the government
for such deficient or non-existent "care" was actionable under the
False Claims Act.229 Because the care was deemed to be worthless, or
worse than no care at all, the government assessed damages to be all
Medicaid and TRICARE monies that flowed to the facility during the
223. See id. 7, 11.
224. See id. 7, 18.
225. See id. 9 12.
226. See United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Ctr. of Okla., 945 F. Supp.
1485 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
227. See id.
228. Id. at 1488.
229. See id. at 1489 (quoting Second Am. Compl. at 7, 1 28-29).
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relevant period. The Aranda case settled for $750,000 soon after the
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Since Geri-Med and Aranda the Department has pursued several
more cases against long term care facilities under failure of care theo-
ries. Many of these cases have been brought in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania2 . with others being pursued in otherjurisdictions.23 ' In
general, these cases have involved egregious failures of care with dev-
astating consequences for the vulnerable victims.2"2 Although the de-
230. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. No. 98-4253 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7,
1998) (settled for $50,000, plus $15,000 designated to improve residents' quality of life;
and a judicially entered consent agreement imposing a monitor and detailed protocols),
United States v. Chester Care Ctr., No. 98-cv-139 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 1998) (settled for
$500,000 and a consent order and judgment imposing a temporary manager and monitor
as well as protocols covering three facilities); United States v. IHS, at Penn Inc., (E.D. Pa.
May, 1999) (settled for $195,000 and settlement agreement terms to impose a temporary
monitor for one year, three years of mandatory in-service training on wound care and
dietary management, and incontinence management; the agreement covered only that fa-
cility, not the entire IHS chain); United States v. Mercy Douglass Human Serv. Corp., No.
00-CV-3471 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2000) ($160,000 settlement amount and settlement agree-
ment terms imposing a temporary manager to manage two (of three) homes and monitor
all three homes owned by the parent company); United States v. Ashton Hall Nursing and
Rehabilitation Ctr., (E.D. Pa. 2000) (settled for $60,000 plus an additional $100,000 in
specified improvements; settlement agreement provided for one year of temporary moni-
toring, improved training and protocols on wound care, and implementation within 90
days with HHS/OIG's Voluntary Compliance Guidance for Nursing Facilities); United
States ex rel. Placido v. Manor Care, Civ. No. 98-3094 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2001) (settled for
$90,000, a consent order requiring an independent consultant who had all of the powers
of a monitor, the implementation of a compliance program, and specific protocols).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Kansas Healthcare Investigators, LP, (D. Kan. 1999), which
was resolved for a monetary settlement of $175,000. In United States v. Greenbelt, (D. Md.
1998), a temporary manager was imposed while the case was ongoing. After two subse-
quent surveys showed increasing deficiencies, HCFA initiated a termination action pursu-
ant to a statutory requirement that provides that a facility that does not come into
substantial compliance within the proscribed time limit be terminated. The termination
action was controversial because the temporary manager had only been in the facility a
short amount of time before the action was initiated. Greenbelt unsuccessfully sought a
temporary restraining order to enjoin CMS/HCFA from terminating it. Unable to con-
tinue in operation without government funds, Greenbelt closed. Despite the divergent
views regarding how properly to proceed, the Greenbelt case has been instructive in the
importance of planning, coordinating and consensus building among the many entities
that are potentially involved in these matters, and in carefully thinking about which among
the myriad potential remedies to pursue and in what sequence. See also United States v.
Pineview Extended Care Ctr. (D. Md. 2001) (resolving civil and administrative claims for
$400,000 and a CIA imposing a monitor on most of the facilities managed by Future Care
for a period of three years) United States v. BEP Servs., LP (D. Ky. 2001) (resolving civil
and administrative claims for $382,149 and comprehensive integrity provisions including a
monitor at all BEP facilities and protocols to protect residents). Additional cases in other
jurisdictions also are underway.
232. See Plaintiff's Complaint 16-20, Chester Care, No. 98-cv-139.
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tails of each case will not be discussed here, a few additional cases bear
note.
c. United States v. Chester Care
United States v. Chester Care demonstrates the range of remedies
available to the United States. A False Claims Act action was resolved
in 1998, but persistent allegations of failures of care after the initial
settlement spawned both a contempt action in 2000233 and a permis-
sive exclusion action in 2001.234
The facts giving rise to the first action were as follows. Although
the facility had received notice that its water heater was malfunction-
ing, a mute resident - unable to cry out - was placed in a bath of
scalding water, leading to her death.235 The aide responsible for plac-
ing her in the bath was prosecuted for manslaughter by the state.236
The allegation came to the attention of the United States Attorney's
office, which opened an investigation revealing that three other
Chester Care residents had died, apparently as a result of the facility
mismanaging their treatment for diabetes. At another facility under
the same ownership, a resident allegedly had died after suffering pre-
ventable weight loss and decubiti that lead to sepsis and death. 237 A
survey at a third facility under the same ownership indicated a poten-
tially troubling and harmful downward trend in care.238
Resolution of Chester Care included a consent order imposing a
temporary manager (to run two of the three Chester Care facilities), a
temporary monitor (to periodically inspect all three facilities), and
payment of $500,000 to the United States.239
Despite some initial improvements, monitor reports in 1999 be-
gan to note problems with wound care, incontinence care, and other
problems related to staff shortages and corporate pressure to admit
new residents despite inadequate staffing. 24 ° One of the Chester Care
facilities, Manchester House, violated the consent order's require-
ments.24i This resulted in a civil contempt action brought by the
United States in January 2000.242 Manchester House entered into a
233. See United States v. Manchester House, No. 98-cv-139 (stipulated order).
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2001).
235. See Plaintiffs Complaint 17-18, Chester Care, No. 98-cv-139.
236. See Plaintiffs Complaint 1 17, Chester Care, No. 98-cv-139.
237. See id. 19.
238. See id.
239. See Consent Order 8, 17, Chester Care, No. 98-cv-139.
240. See United States v. Manchester House, No. 98-cv-139 (stipulated order).
241. See id.
242. See id.
2001]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARL LAW & PoLIcY
stipulated order acknowledging the violations and agreeing, among
other things, that the facility would be run by a temporary-indepen-
dent manager.243
In addition to the False Claims Act and contempt actions, an-
other federal law enforcement measure available in failure of care
cases - a permissive exclusion action pursued by the OIG - also came
into play in Chester Care. Based on the evidence developed during the
investigations, OIG Office of Counsel pursued a permissive exclusion
action against Walter Strine in 2001. Strine, the managing partner
and largest single owner in the limited partnership that owned
Chester Care and Manchester House, exerted considerable control
over the facility operations.244 Section 1128 (b) (6) (B) of the Social Se-
curity Act authorizes the OIG to exclude any individual or entity that
"has furnished or caused to be furnished items or services to patients
(whether or not eligible for benefits under [Medicare] or under a
State health care program) substantially in excess of the needs of such
patients or of a quality which fails to meet professional recognized standards of
healthcare."'24 5
The target of the exclusion (the respondent) has no right to an
administrative hearing until after the exclusion takes effect.2 4 6 If the
respondent files an appeal, there is a formal adversarial proceeding
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) .247
Unfortunately, even deploying the federal remedies trifecta
(False Claims Act, contempt, and exclusion actions) did not result in
the facilities providing quality care. Since January 2000, Chester Care
and Manchester House both have closed.2 48
243. See id.
244. See Patti Mengers, Facing Tough Economy, Strines Move to Close Two Homes, DEL. CO.
TIMES, at http://www.delcotimes.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=1901233&BRD=1675&PAG=
461&deptid=449258&rfi=8.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (6) (B) (2001) (emphasis added). Although by no means an
exclusive list, examples of sources for the standard of care may be found at 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.2 (1998) (defining "professionally recognized standards of care."). See also 42
C.F.R. § 483 (1998) (setting forth the conditions a nursing facility must meet as a condi-
tion of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs). A facility's own policies
and protocols may provide more detail, setting forth how the facility expects its employees
to deliver care. In addition, CMS' interpretive guidelines for surveyors list additional
sources for establishing the professional standards of quality care. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 483.20(k) (3) (i) (1998).
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f)(1) (2001).
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f)(2) (2001).
248. See Mengers, supra note 244.
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d. United States v. National Healthcare Corp.
In United States v. National Healthcare Corp.,2 49 the government
presented evidence that at least two residents died as the result of
"woefully low staff numbers at [a] facility" rendering it impossible for
the facility to have provided all the care for which it billed the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs. 250 The False Claims Act liability arose as
a result of the nursing home's knowing failure to "care for its re-
sidents in such a manner and in such an environment as will promote
maintenance or enhancement of the quality of life,' 251 as required by
law, but nonetheless bill to the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 25
2
NHC was settled just before trial in late 2001 for a payment of
$250,000 to resolve both False Claims Act and administrative claims.
NHC also entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with
OIG Office of Counsel, pursuant to which it agreed to the imposition
of a temporary monitor and protocols designed to protect residents
and improve care.
HHS/OIG routinely has negotiated and imposed CIAs covering
financial compliance issues on defendants in exchange for not pursu-
ing a permissive exclusion action. With the advent of failure of care
cases OIG developed a CIA (in collaboration with CMS and DOJ) sim-
ilar to the consent judgements and settlement agreements previously
negotiated by the Department ofJustice, that included terms designed
to improve compliance with quality of care requirements. 253 Such a
CIA, aimed at improving care, was part of the settlement package
resolving the NHC matter, as well as in several other recent failure of
care cases discussed infta.25 4
e. United States v. Twin Oaks
In late 1998, in response to the announcement of the initiation of
the Department's Nursing Home Initiative, state and federal investiga-
tive and administrative agencies concerned with nursing home mat-
ters in Louisiana held a meeting to discuss and coordinate the
activities of their respective agencies. After developing the goal of
249. 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149. See also supra text accompanying notes 191-192.
250. See id. at 1053.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b) (2001).
252. See NHC Health Care, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
253. Expansion of a CIA to cover quality as well as financial issues, however, is a rela-
tively recent occurrence. The first CIA that included provisions for training, internal over-
sight, and other procedures designed to enhance quality of care, was in the Guardian Post
Acute matter. See State v. Guardian Nursing Ctrs., (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000).
254. See NHC Health Care Corporate Integrity Agreement, available at http://oig.hhs.
gov/fraud/cias.html. Other failure of care CIAs also are available at the same web site.
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identifying and remedying the problems of particularly poor facilities
within the state, the group began to systematically evaluate homes
based on the information and records of each entity. Their review
eventually focused on the Twin Oaks Nursing Home, a for-profit, 100
bed facility in LaPlace, Louisiana. The ensuing investigation by the
FBI, OIG-HHS, the MFCU and the U.S. Attorney's Office uncovered
systemic failures of care as a result of inadequate supervision and staff-
ing. Numerous patients suffered injuries and some died from dehy-
dration, malnutrition, and severe bedsores. Those pursuing the
investigation relied heavily on the expertise and advice of indepen-
dent medical experts who read and interpreted the patient and facility
medical records. The case was settled in the latter part of 2001 for
$100,000 and included a CIA imposing a temporary monitor and pro-
tocols designed to improve care. This case, the result of the collabora-
tive efforts and diligence of myriad federal, state and local entities,
including the United States Attorney's Office, the FBI, HHS-OIG, the
MFCU, and the State Department of Health, is a model for govern-
ment cooperation and collaboration in failure of care cases. Similar
efforts also are underway in a few other states.
f Vencor (now Kindred Healthcare)
The last few years have presented new challenges in handling
cases against long term care entities, with the financial decline and
bankruptcy filings in 1999 and 2000 of five of the seven largest nursing
home chains (owning approximately 300 to 450 facilities each).255
For five such substantial entities to file for bankruptcy in such a short
period (in addition to many smaller entities) was extraordinary (and
the subject of a hearing by the Senate Special Committee on Aging in
September 2000). Further complicating the picture, the United
State's False Claims Act investigations against some of these entities
involved monetary claims of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, in
addition to troubling failure of care claims. In addition to the finan-
cial harm to the United States caused by the allegations of massive
fraud, the bankruptcies posed a potential and oft-threatened public
health threat of a chain suddenly closing, putting in question how to
255. See in reVencor, Inc., No. 99-3199 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 13, 1999); in reSun Health-
care, Inc., No. 99-3657 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 14, 1999); in re Integrated Health Serv., Inc.,
No. 00-00605 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 02, 2000); in re Mariner Health Grp., No. 00-0113
(Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 18, 2000); in re Genesis Health Servs. Corp, No. 00-02619 (Bankr. D.
Del. June 22, 2000).
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assure the continued care of and avoid the sudden eviction of and
potential harm to tens of thousands of sick, frail residents.256
As these bankruptcy actions unfolded, the Department of Health
and Human Services worked closely with the state survey agencies,
long term care ombudsman, and others, to monitor whether and to
what extent the care offered by the bankrupt facilities was compro-
mised as a result of their financial problems and created "contingency
plans" in the event any of the chains suddenly closed or liquidated.
The Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services, balanc-
ing the government's public health, law enforcement, and fiscal inter-
ests, worked closely to negotiate appropriate settlements. On the one
hand, bankruptcy should not provide general amnesty for massive
fraud. On the other hand, the Departments were mindful of the po-
tential public health ramifications of the sudden closure of any one of
the chains.
Vencor, Inc., was one of the nation's seven largest nursing home
chains, with more than 350 facilities (both nursing homes and long
term acute care hospitals). In 1999 Vencor became the first of the
major chains to file for bankruptcy." 7 On May 1, 1998 Vencor
changed its name to Ventas, and Ventas spun off everything it owned
except the physical facilities and real estate to a new company called
Vencor Operating, Inc. Vencor Operating, which changed its name
back to Vencor, operated the hospitals, nursing homes, and rehabili-
tation facilities.258 In January 1999 Ventas began operating as a real
estate investment trust (REIT) .151 Ventas leased all or substantially all
of its facilities to Vencor. Vencor, in turn, leased all or substantially all
of its facilities from Ventas.26 °
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, numerous qui tam cases had been
filed against Vencor, including one case that alleged serious failures,
such as severe understaffing resulting in neglect, harm, and death of
residents. 26 1 The relator's allegations brought the matter to the atten-
tion of federal law enforcement for the first time, leading to an investi-
256. See Administration on Aging, Transfer Trauma: Minimizing the Impact on Community
Based and Institutionalized Elders (visited 12/20/2001) <http://www.aoa.gov/aoa/disaster/
manual/gtran.html>.
257. See in reVencor, Inc., No. 99-3199 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 13, 1999).
258. See Vince Galloro, Vencor Gone But Not Forgotten: Name Change to Kindred Doesn't End
Company's Legal Battles or Those of its Landlord, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 11, 2001, at 22,
available in 2001 WL 9418816.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Vencor and Ventas Paying U.S. $219 Mil-
lion to Resolve Health Care Claims as Part of Vencor's Bankruptcy Reorganization (Mar.
19, 2001). One of these failure of care actions was investigated and settled by the U.S.
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gation by the Department of Justice in conjunction with the Defense
Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and HHS/OIG. The initial in-
vestigation uncovered the long history of non-compliance and thus
was expanded, becoming the first investigation of its type to examine
widespread systemic problems at a major chain in an effort to deter-
mine whether the problems alleged were chain-wide or isolated.
Despite having been identified, the problems were not reported
to law enforcement until a qui tam whistleblower did so. Further, the
problems appear to have persisted until the FCA investigation com-
menced as a result of the qui tam filing. The relator alleged knowing
false statements and understaffing to satisfy corporate financial goals
that resulted in patient harm. As part of the consensual plan of reor-
ganization that lifted it out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Vencor agreed
to settle False Claims Act claims with a payment to the United States of
more than $100 million.262 Approximately $20 million of that
amount was attributable to failure of care claims, representing by far
the largest failure of care case ever settled. 263 Vencor also settled
HHS overpayment claims for an additional $25 million. 264 The settle-
ment was funded in part by Ventas, Inc., the real estate investment
trust. As it emerged from bankruptcy, the first of the major chains to
do so, Vencor changed its name to Kindred Health Care.265
As part of the Vencor reorganization, OIG pursued a ground-
breaking national chain-wide CIA, encompassing not only financial in-
tegrity but also quality-of-care compliance issues. Like the consent
decrees, settlement agreements, and CLAs in the failure of care cases
involving individual facilities and smaller chains, the Vencor/Kindred
CIA agreement calls for a temporary-independent monitor (paid for
by the defendant) .266 Because the chain consisted of approximately
350 facilities, instead of requiring specific detailed facility-specific pro-
tocols, the CIA calls for implementation of systemic controls, improve-
Attorney's Office in the District of Minnesota for over $300,000. See Annual Report 2001,
available at http://www. usdoj.gov/usao/mn/index.html.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See Shanon D. Murray, Goodbye Vencor, Hello Kindred Healthcare, DAiLY DEAL, Apr. 24,
2001, available in 2001 WL 20232505.
266. The Kindred monitor is the Long Term Care Institute, a private, not for profit
entity headed by David Zimmerman, PhD, of the University of Wisconsin. Dr. Zimmer-
man, an expert in nursing home data, is one of the creators of the "quality indicators,"
which are a synthesis of Minimum Data Set (MDS) information relating to resident status
and care. Quality indicators, among other things, provide a way to analyze the MDS to
reveal "red flags" and potential trouble areas that, while not dispositive, should receive
additional scrutiny.
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ments, and training, under the guidance of the monitor.267 The goal
of the CIA was not only to improve care and practices in the short
term, but to address problems in corporate culture in the hope that
improvements would become standard operating procedure and re-
main in place even after the term of the agreement expires.26
Kindred's compliance director became involved early in the pro-
cess by evaluating the factors relevant to quality, and was actively in-
volved in negotiating and subsequently in implementing the CIA with
0IG. Kindred's compliance team continues to work closely with the
independent monitor and with OIG to identify and address isolated
and systemic problems, to try to distinguish between them, and to im-
plement safeguards to prevent future failures.
It appears that temporary monitors, specific and/or systemic pro-
tocols, and occasionally, temporary managers, have led to increased
compliance with the law and improvements in the care provided in
numerous long term care facilities. Such CIAs and other types of
agreements containing similar requirements are being implemented
in a growing number of cases. It therefore would be very useful to
empirically evaluate their impact on the quality of care provided by
the providers subject to those agreements. Such an analysis would
provide valuable information in the types of modifications, if any,
needed to adapt the agreements to different types of problems and
providers, so that such agreements are as effective as possible. Until
more data have been gathered, however, it remains critical to work
toward those remedies such as these, that common sense and prelimi-
nary results indicate are beneficial.
Another factor in the success of bringing a problematic facility or
chain into compliance is the willingness and commitment of the facil-
ity and those who run it to address the problems in a proactive, com-
prehensive, and thorough fashion. This includes a willingness to
devote significant resources, energy, intelligence, and creativity, to
promoting change, assigning top priority to the delivery of quality
care, and creating a corporate culture that rewards such activity.
B. Criminal Cases
The Department to date also has resolved a few criminal cases
that relate to failures in long term care, and other cases are under-
way. Federal law provides several statutes under which the Depart-
ment may pursue criminal charges for false statements, false claims, or
267. See Kindred Corporate Integrity Agreement (on file with author).
268. See id.
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other wrongdoing.26 The subject of that falsity may be care, services,
billing, the condition of a resident, or it may be intended to conceal
an error, condition, failure, or other wrongdoing. 270
1. Failure of Care Cases Against Individuals
In the first known case of its kind, federal criminal charges were
brought in a case involving an elderly woman who wandered away
from the Arkansas nursing home where she was a resident.2 71 She was
found with a deep wound on her forehead and various cuts and
bruises, lying in a fetal position on a gravel road outside of the facility.
The home's Director of Nursing (DoN) and an aide returned her to
the nursing home, where they changed her clothing and placed her
in her bed before calling for an ambulance.272 The ambulance trans-
ported the woman to a nearby hospital, along with an incident report
prepared by the DoN that falsely reported that the woman had fallen
in her room and struck her forehead on a night stand. 273 This initial
false report began a four year conspiracy between the DoN and the
facility's administrator to conceal the circumstances surrounding the
incident from the Arkansas Long Term Care Office, the FBI, and a
state police detective. 274 The woman died within 24 hours, after hav-
ing been returned to the facility by the hospital, who failed to take x-
rays or perform a physical exam. 275 After repeatedly lying to investiga-
tors and continuing to submit false records and documents, the Ad-
ministrator and DoN were charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1518
with making and conspiring to make false statements to federal offi-
cials regarding the events leading to the resident's death.276 Both
269. Federal criminal statutes under which the United States might pursue prosecutions
implicating quality or failure of long term care could include: 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2001) (mispri-
sion of a felony); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2001) (health care fraud incorporating definition from
18 U.S.C. § 1346); 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (2001) (false statements about health care matters); 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (2001) (false statements); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2001) (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (2001) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2001) (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 286 (2001)
(false statements to the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2001) (same); 18 U.S.C. § 1516
(2001) (obstruction of a federal audit); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2001) (obstruction of proceed-
ings before a grand jury); 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2001) (obstruction of a federal investigation);
18 U.S.C. § 1518 (2001) (obstruction of a criminal health care investigation); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623 (2001) (perjury).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, No. 4:1998cr00219 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 15, 2000);
United States v. Turner, No. 4:1998cr00215 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 15, 2000).
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
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pled guilty277 and were sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. In
such a case, the defendants also may have been prosecuted under
other provisions for the false record entries made in the nursing
home records.2
78
A second case involved a nurse who erroneously failed to note in
the record a physician's verbal order to reduce a nursing home resi-
dent's Coumadin (anti-coagulant) dose. 279 The nurse then adminis-
tered the higher dose causing severe physical reactions and bleeding.
After she discovered her mistake she falsified the medical record to
conceal her error, thereby further compounding damage to the resi-
dent who continued to get too much Coumadin and did not get treat-
ment to mitigate the ensuing problems. 280 The resident subsequently
bled to death. 28 ' The nurse who falsified the record was prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1035. She was given a ten month sentence and is
not allowed to practice nursing in the future without court
approval.282
2. Systemic Criminal Failure of Care Cases
Federal criminal laws include provisions that might be used to
redress systemic failures of care. Any scheme or artifice to defraud
any health care benefit program or obtain payment by means of false
representations in connection with the delivery of health care services
or items is a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1347. The phrase "scheme or
artifice to defraud" is specifically defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to in-
clude "depriv[ing] another of the intangible right of honest services."
In addition, more traditional criminal charges may be brought in
various types of criminal cases. For example, conspiracy,283 mail
fraud,2 8 4 and wire fraud,2 85 charges may be brought where material
failures of care occur yet the facility continues to bill for care that was
not provided or provided at such a substandard level as to be tanta-
mount to no care at all. The mail and wire fraud statutes also may be
applied where a provider's advertising and mailing of promotional
brochures contain false statements about the type, level and quality of
277. See Plea Agreement, Turner, No. LR-CR-98-215; Plea Agreement, Crawford, No. LR-
CR-98-219.
278. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (2001).
279. See United States v. Taibi, No 01-212 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2001).
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2001).
284. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2001).
285. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2001).
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care, or items such as staffing levels.2 8 6 In addition, certain false and
knowingly executed certifications submitted in the course of billing
Medicare/Medicaid might constitute felony violations. If nursing
home personnel are aware of felony health care fraud violations and
do not report them to appropriate authorities and take steps to con-
ceal them, they may be charged with misprision of a felony under 18
U.S.C. § 4.
Finally, as occurred in the Arkansas case, the individuals who
committed the criminal acts may lie to nursing home inspectors and
thereby obstruct a federal audit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1516. False
statements to federal agents investigating the matters violates 18
U.S.C. § 1001, and perjury before a federal grand jury violates 18
U.S.C. § 1623.
3. Potential Quality Issues in Criminal Prosecutions
As noted infra, HHS/OIG has the statutory authority to pursue
the exclusion of certain providers from federal health care pro-
grams.2 87 Under the exclusion statute HHS/OIG may, in its discre-
tion, seek "permissive" exclusion of providers for abuse and neglect or
failure to provide services that meet the requisite standard of care.
2 88
Once a provider has been convicted of a criminal healthcare related
offence, however, exclusion is mandatory and OIG has no discre-
tion.2 8 9 Thus, the criminal conviction of a long term care provider
leads inexorably to its exclusion. 290
In February 2000, the United States entered into a global settle-
ment with Beverly Enterprises, the nation's largest nursing home
chain, to resolve claims that Beverly had committed financial fraud
because it charged unallowable costs to Medicare. 29 ' The settlement
required Beverly to pay a $170 million civil settlement and a $5 mil-
lion criminal fine. 29 2 In addition, a Beverly subsidiary owning ten fa-
cilities in five states (Beverly of California, Inc.) pled guilty to a felony
which required the mandatory exclusion of that subsidiary.2 9 3 The
286. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2001).
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2001).
288. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2001).
289. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (2001).
290. See id.
291. See Beverly Enterprises, Inc., Settlement Agreement (2000).
292. See id.
293. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Bil-
lion in Whistleblowers False Claims Act Awards and Settlements (Feb. 24, 2000); Seth Ro-
senfeld, Largest Ever Case Against Rest Home Nets $170 Million, S. F. EXAM'R, Feb. 2, 2000, at
A4, available in 2000 WrL 6158887.
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Department worked closely with HHS/OIG and CMS to craft an
agreement that would protect residents from the sudden closure of
facilities as the result of a mandatory exclusion. The ensuing agree-
ment, modeled on agreements entered into between the Federal
Trade Commission and health care providers in other contexts, re-
sulted in what is called a "divestiture agreement" between OIG and
Beverly. The divestiture agreement required Beverly to divest itself of
the facilities owned by Beverly of California, Inc., before the exclusion
took effect and provided for various sanctions if it failed to do so. 294
Divestiture agreements are important tools. 29 5 They permit ag-
gressive criminal prosecution of long term care providers, where ap-
propriate, to protect residents and promote the integrity of the
programs, while assuring that the potential impact of any ensuing ex-
clusion is borne by the wrongdoing entity and not the frail residents
who are the intended beneficiaries of the defrauded programs. In
other words, divestiture agreements help to assure that vulnerable re-
sidents do not wind up paying the price for the crimes of the facilities
charged with their care.
4. Public Corruption Cases
Another type of criminal case also may have a bearing on the
quality of long term care. Public corruption can harm residents
where the requisite nursing home standards are improperly compro-
mised. A federal criminal public corruption case involving nursing
homes arose in Oklahoma.296 In October 2000, the state's deputy
294. The divestiture agreement required Beverly to operate the facilities and care for
residents in a lawful fashion until divestiture, and divest itself of the ten facilities within a
specified time frame prior to the effective date of exclusion. If Beverly failed to sell the
facilities within that time frame, the agreement gave dIG the option of imposing a trustee
(of GIG's choosing) to dispose of the facilities on terms determined by GIG, imposing a
daily fine until the facilities were sold, or exchanging one or more of the ten facilities on
the list for another Beverly facility in the event that it was proven contrary to the govern-
ment's or the beneficiarys' interests to sell one or more of the ten facilities owned by the
entity to be excluded. As part of the overall deal, in addition to the divestiture agreement,
GIG also entered into a corporate integrity agreement (CIA) with Beverly covering finan-
cial integrity concerns. See Beverly Enterprises, Inc., Settlement Agreement (2000).
295. A divestiture agreement also is a useful tool in the case of a state or local health
care criminal conviction, which similarly triggers mandatory exclusion. Thus, GIG entered
into a divestiture agreement in State v. Guardian Post Acute. See supra note 92. In the
months that followed the indictment of Guardian Post Acute the assistant District Attorney
became very familiar with GIG's Office of Counsel of HHS/OIG and its mandatory exclu-
sion authority, working closely with that office in negotiating a satisfactory resolution of the
case.
296. See Randy Ellis, files Pleads Not Guilty to Federal Charges, DALY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 28,
2002, at IA, available in 2002 WL 14474916 [hereinafter Ellis 2002].
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commissioner for health, Brent Van Meter, and a nursing home
owner, James Smart, were convicted of agreeing to accept a bribe and
of offering to pay a bribe, respectively. 297 More recently, Van Meter
again was charged with soliciting a bribe, this time from a different
nursing home operator, E.W. "Dub"Jiles.298 Jiles also was indicted for
allegedly paying bribes in exchange for relocating residents of closed
homes to facilities in which he had a financial interest, and of conspir-
ing with Van Meter to get preferential treatment.2 9
C. Civil Rights Cases
The Civil Rights Division of the Department ofJustice may pursue
cases involving public entities under the Civil Rights of Institutional-
ized Persons Act (CRIPA)3 ° ° when nursing homes or other public in-
stitutions have neglected or abused residents entrusted to their care,
or have failed to meet residents' constitutional or federal statutory
right to adequate care and services.3 ' Public nursing homes make up
approximately seven percent of all nursing homes."0 2 CRIPA cases
generally involve an extensive investigation of the conditions and
practices at the facility, efforts to remedy the offending practices, and,
where necessary, the filing of a CRIPA action. 0 3 Resolution of CRIPA
actions may include a written agreement between the Department
and the jurisdiction that provides for remedial relief in each of the
areas in which the institution failed to meet the needs of the residents,
such as medical and nursing care, psychiatric care and services, physi-
cal, occupational and speech therapy, protection from harm, abuse
and neglect, and undue or improper use of restraints.30 4 In order to
ensure ongoing compliance the agreements typically provide for ex-
297. See id. Throughout 2001, a state grand jury that investigated "ghost" employment
within the Oklahoma Health Department indicted 14 current and former employees on
assorted state charges, primarily relating to obtaining pay for work not performed or falsify-
ing time sheets. See Randy Ellis, Fired Health Agency Worker Pleads Guilty, DAILY OKLAHoMA,
Oct. 18, 2001, at 3A, available in 2001 WL 28492438. See also Indictment, United States v.
Van Meter (W.D. Okla. 2000) (No. CR-00-067-T).
298. See Indictment, United States v. Jiles (W.D. Okla. 2002) (No. CR-02-029-C); Ellis
2002, supra note 296, at IA.
299. See id.
300. 28 U.S.C. § 1997 (2001).
301. See id.
302. See DATA COMPENDIUM, supra note 130, at iii.
303. See Letter from Deval Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
United States Department ofJustice, to The Honorable Sharon Pratt Kelly, Mayor of the District of
Columbia 1 (Oct. 3, 1994), at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dcvillfind.htm.
304. See City of Philadelphia, Settlement Agreement, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/
documents/philsa.htm.
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tensive on-site monitoring of the remedial agreement and full access
provisions.3"'
The Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division pursues
not only CRIPA cases involving nursing homes, but also matters in-
volving other types of long term care institutions such as facilities for
individuals with mental retardation or developmental disabilities, psy-
chiatric institutions, juvenile detention facilities and jails and pris-
ons.3 °6  CRIPA actions usually result in consent decrees and
monitoring of consent decrees by the Civil Rights Division. 0 7
In 1995 the Department's Civil Rights Division investigated a pub-
lic Philadelphia nursing home pursuant to CRIPA.3 °s The allegations
included that residents had suffered sexual assaults, physical assaults,
unexplained decubitus ulcers, weight loss, and nutritional problems.
The investigation also revealed that the facility used unnecessary
chemical restraints (psychotropic and other medications).3°9 The in-
vestigation established that only two physicians were caring for 480
patients, many of whom were critically ill, and that the nursing charts
in many cases were non-existent or non-sensical3 1l Several residents
allegedly died as a result of gross failures to provide the most basic
care and other wrongdoing.311 The Civil Rights Division, together
with the U.S. Attorney's office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
in United States v. City of Philadelphia, brought joint civil rights and
False Claims Act claims in the same complaint.312 The matter was re-
solved for $50,000 and a judicially entered settlement agreement that
imposed a temporary monitor and required compliance with certain,
very detailed protocols. 3 1
3
305. See id.
306. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, No. 97-CVB-71514-BDT (E.D. Mich. Mar. 10,
1997).
307. The statute requires that the complaint be signed by the Attorney General, a non-
delegatable responsibility. In addition, by statute, CRIPA cases must be handled by the
Civil Rights Division and cannot be delegated for handling by United States Attorney's
offices.
308. See Plaintiffs Complaint 23-38, United States v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. No. 98-
4253 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1998).
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See City of Philadelphia, Settlement Agreement, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/
documents/philsa.htm.
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D. Criticism of Cases
Some in the nursing home defense bar have asserted that use of
the False Claims Act in failure of care cases constitutes improper regu-
lation and that law enforcement actions are an inappropriate re-
sponse to failures of care in long term care facilities.3 1 4 Some claim
that such cases create an untenable "punitive" atmosphere, to the det-
riment of the industry. 15 Others in the provider bar have no com-
plaint with the failure of care cases pursued to date, acknowledging
that the Department has used the remedy carefully, appropriately,
and in clearly egregious circumstances.
Vehement criticism also has issued forth from the other end of
the spectrum. Some citizen advocates criticize the Department (as
well as other advocates, HHS, Congress and virtually all relevant gov-
ernment entities) for being too lenient in pursuing these issues. They
argue that more cases should be brought, more owners, corporate en-
tities and high level personnel should be pursued, higher damage
awards, fines and restitution should be sought, and that more people
should go to jail.
Based on the relentless reports of unlawful abuse and neglect in
long term care, and based on reports that it is widespread, under-re-
ported, infrequently prosecuted, and the cause of untold suffering,
injury, illness, and death, it certainly would appear that law enforce-
ment should be playing a more significant role, and that more individ-
uals and entities who cause the abuse and neglect should be held
responsible.
A federal abuse and neglect statute could greatly facilitate federal
law enforcement's ability to prosecute such cases. In the meantime,
however, it is important to continue identifying and pursuing cases
with existing authority - the programmatic remedies available to
CMS, the exclusion actions, CIAs, and divestiture agreements available
to HHS/OIG, and the civil, criminal, and civil rights actions available
to the Department of Justice. These measures provide a potent array
of tools in the face of unlawful abuse and neglect. The vulnerable and
growing number of long term care residents are almost entirely de-
pendant on their care givers. When caregivers violate that trust, soci-
ety and the victims themselves must be able to depend on those
responsible for enforcing the law to pursue some form of justice.
314. See, e.g., Robert Fabrikant & Glenn Soloman, Application of the Federal False Claims Act
to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51 Atx. L. REV. 105, 105-06 (1999).
315. SeeJohn Boese, Can Substandard Medical Care Become Fraud? Understanding an Unfor-
tunate Expansion of Liability Under the Civil False Claims Act, BRIEF, Summer 2000, at 5.
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IV. THE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ,
Justice may come in many forms. The best form of justice for all
involved is prevention. Many other factors, however, also are relevant
to promoting justice, such as increasing the knowledge base and iden-
tifying protocols that will enhance our ability to detect and diagnose
abuse and neglect, effective treatment and other assistance for victims,
prompt reporting of suspected violations, careful selection of
caregivers, and myriad interventions, including emergency, medical,
social service, policy, reimbursement, advocacy, legal, legislative, and
multi-disciplinary interventions. Enhancing our capacity in each of
these domains is critical if we are to address the problems in long
term care, not just in the form of prosecutions after the fact, but in a
more comprehensive manner. In other words, our ability to progress
on each of these fronts will in turn have a bearing on our ability to
promote justice.
A. Overview
Pursuing cases is not the only role to be played by federal law
enforcement. Also vital is the Department's "administration of jus-
tice," in which the Department on its own, in collaboration with
others, or by funding other entities, takes steps to assess the problem,
study the phenomenon and what interventions work, promote aware-
ness, coordinate the many relevant entities, provide training and edu-
cation, and take other necessary steps to improve our ability to
prevent, detect, treat, intervene in, report, investigate, and prosecute
abuse and neglect of older and disabled people in long term care and
other settings.
It is widely acknowledged that our response to abuse and neglect
of elders and those in long term care lags decades behind our re-
sponse to other complex and intractable problems such as domestic
violence, sexual abuse, and child abuse and neglect. There are well-
established gaps in our knowledge and in our ability to respond at
each step in the process.
1. Detection
Because of a low level of awareness about the problem, a dearth
of research, poor distribution of information that does exist, and the
rarity with which the issue is assigned priority or taken seriously, those
on the front lines, in the best position to detect abuse or neglect in
2001]
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long term care, rarely are able, trained, or have the resources to do
SO. 316
2. Diagnosis
The physical conditions that accompany abuse and neglect in an
older person often are masked by, or mimic, other physical conditions
associated with aging and illness (for example decubiti, malnutrition,
dehydration, falls, and bruising).317 Because the physical conditions of
aging and/or disease often so closely resemble those caused by abuse
or neglect, it may be vital to have someone with expertise in distin-
guishing between the two assist with the diagnosis. This is compli-
cated because there is little research to identify and isolate specific
forensic markers (research, for example, that will guide practitioners
in determining which bruises, fractures, decubitus, and types of mal-
nutrition and dehydration are the result of abuse or neglect) or illu-
minate forensic methodology. 18 Moreover, unlike child abuse, where
a group of forensic pediatricians assist with the management of these
issues, there is as yet no similar group of forensic geriatricians. 19
3. Reporting
The paucity of reporting likely is caused in part by a lack of unfa-
miliarity with the problem and how to identify it, by the absence of
protocols for what to do when someone sees something that concerns
them, and by controversy about mandatory reporting laws them-
selves.32° The failure to report abuse and neglect likely precludes
most intervention, treatment, or prosecution. Thus, a concerted ef-
fort is needed to promote, and if necessary compel, better reporting.
4. Intervention
When abuse and/or neglect come to light, there are several possi-
ble interventions, including emergency, medical, social service, relig-
ious, cultural, community, advocacy, and legal interventions. Little
evidence-based information exists relating to which one or combina-
tion among the myriad possible interventions are feasible, most suc-
cessful, and susceptible to replication.321 It is broadly assumed,
316. See Mark Lachs, Selected Clinical and Forensic Issues in Elder Abuse, in MED. FORENSIC
ISSUES, supra note 8, 116.
317. See id.
318. See id. 117.
319. See id.
320. See Catherine Hawes, Elder Justice, in MED. FORENSlC ISSUES, supra note 8, 75.
321. See id. 85.
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however, based on experience in this and other fields, that multi-disci-
plinary and inter-disciplinary interventions are most effective, given
the highly diverse nature of the disciplines implicated.3 22 Thus, such
programs should be developed, replicated and studied.
5. Prosecution and Other Legal Interventions
As noted above, the realm of possible interventions includes legal
interventions. These may include public and private lawsuits, judicial
and legislative action, and the government acting in a police power
(prosecution) and parens patriae (protective) capacity. Specific types
of cases range from private personal injury law suits, guardianship and
power of attorney related actions, as well as failure of care cases, such
as those discussed above. There is little uniformity in how these mat-
ters are prosecuted from state-to-state or from community-to-commu-
nity. At the federal level, the existing laws, while providing some
recourse, do not provide ideal causes of action for pursuing abuse and
neglect in long term care. In addition, prosecutions at all levels are
hampered by (1) the paucity of research developing "forensic mark-
ers" and methodologies to guide identification and diagnosis of abuse
and neglect, 23 (2) the paucity of experts (including forensic geriatri-
cians or geriatric nurse practitioners) to provide assistance with the
investigation, consultation and testimony,3 24 (3) infrequent report-
ing,3 25 (4) the rarity with which such cases are assigned priority or the
necessary resources,3 26 and (5) a lack of information about which
measures are most effective in remedying existing and deterring and
preventing future abuse and neglect.3 27
These and many other unmet needs give rise to a vicious cycle in
which each gap in knowledge or practice compounds the problems
and makes solutions more elusive. For example, the paucity of re-
search and forensic markers impede detection and diagnosis. Absent
detection there can be no reporting. Absent reporting it is difficult to
intervene with treatment or prosecution. Absent prosecution there
322. See Erik Lindbloom, How Can We Identify the Physical and Psychological Markers of Abuse
and Neglect, in MED. FORENSIC ISSUES, supra note 8, 124.
323. See Kerry Burnright, What Areas of Further Research Would Promote the Detection and
Diagnosis of Elder Abuse and Neglect and Forensic Application Thereof. in MED. FORENSIC ISSUES,
supra note 8, 24.
324. See id. 1 28.
325. See Hawes, Elder Justice, in MED. FORENSIC ISSUES, supra note 8, 9 79-80.
326. See Hearings on the Re-Authorization of the Older Americans Act Before the Subcommittee on
Aging of the Senate Comm. on Aging, 3/29/99 CONG. TEST. (statement of Paul Hodge, ABA
Chairperson Nat'l Health Care Law Enforcement Alliance), available in 1999 WIL 8086532.
327. See Hawes, Elder Justice, in MED. FORENSIC ISSUES, supra note 8, 9 89.
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will be fewer deterrents to future abuses. The paucity of research nar-
rows what is known and what can be taught. Absent comprehensive,
uniform, and accurate data collection and reporting we will not know
the incidence, prevalence, causes, risk factors, or costs that in turn
make it very difficult to formulate a national response.
Perhaps most important, it is imperative to strive for a coordi-
nated and comprehensive plan that includes all relevant entities. Oth-
erwise, we likely will just continue to chip away at small parts of the
problem but not achieve meaningful and lasting change. The prob-
lem is made more formidable by a lack of infrastructure to assure con-
tinued attention and resources. It is compounded by inadequate
coordination among the many entities with authority to address the
issues.328 These serious gaps in our handling of elder abuse and neg-
lect not only impede enforcement, but also result in confusion and
reluctance to grapple with the "big picture," because it is so daunt-
ingly big, so complex and so intractable.
The Department's efforts to identify and address some of these
"administration of justice" issues include the following:
B. Training, Coordination, and Outreach
1. Conferences, Symposia, and Working Groups
The number of entities with potential involvement in preventing
and/or redressing abuse and neglect in long term care is daunting.329
In any given state or community, there may be twenty or more differ-
ent entities or types of professionals with a role in the issue. Too
often, these entities do not coordinate adequately, and sometimes
they are unaware of one another's existence or role.33°
The Department organized a variety of events, including regional
conferences, round table discussions and symposia, in an attempt to
328. See Scott Fornek, ElderAbuse on the Rise, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at 15, availa-
ble in 2001 WL 7255222 [hereinafter Fornek].
329. The list includes providers, family councils, family members and friends of re-
sidents, CMS, state licensing entities, state regulatory entities (if different), state surveyors,
federal surveyors, resident advocates (state and local long term care ombudsman and adult
protective services (APS), federal law enforcement, state law enforcement (MFCU, state
AG's offices; state police, investigators), and local law enforcement (DA, States Attorneys,
local police/sheriffs), HHS/OIG (counsel, investigators, auditors), emergency responders
(firefighters/EMS; ambulance/EMS), medical community (primary care physicians (resi-
dent's personal doctor), emergency room staff, hospital staff, medical examiners, coroners,
nurses, CNAs, therapists, medical directors), and professional licensing entities.
330. See Fornek, supra note 328 at 15 (reporting that many police chiefs in the Chicago
area have little information on the Department of Aging, Illinois' primary agency for deal-
ing with elder abuse, and that there is a lack of coordination between that agency and law
enforcement).
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bridge these communication gaps. The demand to attend these
events, which trained more than 1500 people, reflected significant in-
terest among many disciplines, including law enforcement. Several
groups have encouraged the Department to organize additional train-
ing and coordination efforts, and to continue to play a leadership role
in addressing the issues. The Department's events and efforts to coor-
dinate have included the following:
Four regional nursing home abuse and neglect prevention and prosecu-
tion conferences. These conferences, held between July 1999 and Feb-
ruary 2000, covered problems in long term care, the federal, state and
local enforcement options, case studies, promising practices, and spe-
cial issues in cases against long term care facilities (for example, inves-
tigations, bankruptcies, and threats of facility closures). During these
conferences, among other things, the Department formed State
Working Groups intended to continue and expand multi-disciplinary
coordination at the state and local levels, and promote such coordina-
tion on an ongoing basis." 1 The Department attempted to include
representatives from each state and region, and from each relevant
entity or discipline. At each conference the last session was a report
back from the State Working Group meetings from each state.
Among the most consistent problems discussed were the communica-
tion gaps between those on the front lines who see significant
problems and those with authority to address them. Another problem
identified was that cases of abuse and neglect (even egregious cases)
were not being identified or reported to law enforcement, and that
where there were referrals, law enforcement had insufficient re-
sources or training to handle these difficult and very specialized cases.
State Working Group meeting. To solidify, support, and encourage
the State Working Groups, the Department in June 2000 sponsored a
meeting of State Working Group representatives as well as national
representatives of the umbrella organizations. Then Attorney General
Janet Reno delivered the keynote address in her first of five public
appearances on the topic. 33 2 Educational and working sessions pro-
331. The conferences were held in Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Des Moines, and Colum-
bia, South Carolina. The agenda generally followed the following sequence: (1) establish-
ing the problem, (2) introducing the many potential players, (3) describing the case
studies and the nuts and bolts of pursuing an investigation and prosecution in a nursing
home abuse and neglect case, (4) describing what administrative and law enforcement
remedies were available and how they could be employed alone or together, and (5) pro-
viding an overview of special issues, such as nursing home bankruptcies, the impact of
closures, and how to distinguish abuse or neglect from benign conditions.
332. See Department of Justice, Elder Justice (last modified Mar. 3, 2002) <http://
www.usdoj.gov/elderjustice/>.
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vided an opportunity to learn from the others' successes and ap-
proach to challenges. More than 30 states reported active working
groups at the time, and representatives from more than 40 states at-
tended the meeting. Some states, for example Louisiana and Virginia,
had and have active and productive working groups and outreach ef-
forts that have resulted in referrals of cases to United States Attorney's
offices in those states. Other states reported a variety of challenges,
including dramatic differences of approach among the relevant enti-
ties, turf battles, and the refusal of crucial players to participate in the
process. In general, however, active State Working Groups have re-
ported that the group provides a very useful and productive forum for
addressing and maintaining focus on the issues.
Promising Practices Symposium. In October 2000 the Department,
in partnership with the Department of Health and Human Services,
sponsored a national symposium that showcased coordinated, multi-
disciplinary approaches and encouraged collaborations for respond-
ing to elder victimization of all types, including (1) abuse and neglect
in institutional and residential settings, (2) abuse and neglect in do-
mestic and community settings, and (3) financial fraud and exploita-
tion. State "delegations" met and prepared reports and
recommendations, which, along with the proceedings, were included
in a publication that, among other things, outlined the promising
practices that were discussed.3 3 3
Elder Justice: Medical Forensic Issues in Elder Abuse and Neglect. In
October 2000, the Department organized a roundtable of experts to
discuss medical forensic issues in elder abuse and neglect.
3 3 4
APR[ grant. The Department has made a grant to the American
Prosecutor's Research Institute (APRI) (the policy arm of the Na-
tional District Attorney's Association) to examine the current status of
elder abuse, neglect and exploitation cases pursued by local prosecu-
tors and to examine and prepare a report discussing what local prose-
cutors need to more effectively identify, investigate and prosecute
those cases.
NTIC grant. The Department has made a grant to the National
Training and Information Center (NTIC) to promote awareness, out-
reach, and coordination in addressing elder abuse and neglect among
community, social service, healthcare, and law enforcement groups at
the local level. Among other things, this grant is intended to examine
333. See U.S. Department of Justice, Our Aging Population: Promoting Empowerment,
Preventing Victimization, and Implementing Coordinated Interventions.
334. The transcript and report generated by that meeting are available at http://
www.usdoj.gov under the heading ElderJustice. See infra text accompanying notes 340-350.
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how to encourage prompt identification and reporting of elder abuse
and neglect.
Coordination Efforts at the National Level. Recognizing that coordi-
nation is important not only at the state and local levels, but also at
the national level, the Department has promoted and actively partici-
pated in a number of broad-based multi-disciplinary national
collaborations.
Nursing Home Steering Committee. Coordination at the federal level
has been significantly enhanced by productive monthly Nursing
Home Steering Committee meetings attended by numerous compo-
nents of the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services
to address specific cases as well as policy, training, and legislative is-
sues." 5 This group also has undertaken projects relating to data col-
lection and analysis, identification of problematic facilities and/or
chains, drafted and implemented a certification on the Minimum
Data Set form, discussed and pursued a coordinated interagency ap-
proach, and developed consensus recommendations relating to nu-
merous novel issues relating to long term care matters.
Interagency Elder Justice Working Group. Beginning in 2001 the De-
partment also has been instrumental, and worked closely with the Ad-
ministration on Aging, the National Institute on Aging and HHS-OIG,
in the formation and ongoing efforts of an interagency working group
focusing on elder abuse and neglect issues. This group meets regu-
larly to discuss the many and varied entities' activities as they relate to
elder justice and redressing abuse and neglect, and to identify poten-
tial areas for collaboration.
National Academy of Science Panel on Elder Abuse and Neglect. The
Department worked in collaboration with the National Institute on
Aging (NIA) which sponsored the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) to form a panel charged with creating a national research
agenda on elder abuse and neglect. NAS empaneled a very diverse
group of experts including geriatricians, gerontologists, nurses, attor-
neys, epedemiologists, and Adult Protective Services workers. The
many issues addressed by that panel include how to create a tool to
assist those who come in contact with older people to screen for and
identify abuse. The Department has likewise urged the panel to set
335. The Department also participates in or chairs numerous other interagency and
intergovernmental groups that have a bearing on the quality of long term care, for exam-
ple, groups that meet to discuss topics such as health care fraud, elder abuse and neglect,
long term care, aging, technologies to assist in safe and healthy aging (including those that
mitigate institutional abuse and neglect), and international issues in aging. These activities
are too numerous to discuss and beyond the scope of this article.
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out a research agenda that will result in identifying and describing
"forensic markers" and methodologies to assist practitioners and
others to determine when abuse or neglect have occurred.
Other Outreach. The Department has reached out to and shared
information with long term care providers in an attempt to under-
stand their concerns regarding enforcement and other issues, and to
keep open the lines of communication with those who do a very diffi-
cult job and, when done properly, perform a critical service. Simi-
larly, the Department has reached out to, shared information with,
and heard concerns of law enforcement, social service, and public
health and public safety providers, advocates and academics.
C. Criminal Background Checks
The Department's Steering Committee members have worked
with the FBI, CMS and OIG to promote use of criminal background
check provisions that permit nursing homes and home health provid-
ers to access the FBI's fingerprint data base, the largest, most compre-
hensive, such data base in existence, with more than 39 million sets of
prints.
3 6
In October 1998 Congress enacted Public Law 105-277 which pro-
vides that "[a] nursing facility or home health care agency may submit
a request to the Attorney General to conduct a search and exchange
of [Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history] records
... regarding an applicant for employment if the employment posi-
tion is involved in direct patient care. ' 337 Providers also may obtain
FBI criminal background checks through two other federal statutes. 338
Such background checks are desirable because they are highly reliable
(fingerprint checks are less subject to error or manipulation than
name-based systems), and because they are national and thus provide
a more comprehensive review than checking a single state's criminal
records.339 The Nursing Home Steering Committee has been working
with the FBI to educate providers and the relevant state entities about
the existence of and procedures for obtaining background informa-
tion under this statute.
336. See Health Care Financing Administration, Nursing Homes (visited 1/22/2002)
<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/scindex.htm> (link to "Federal Statutes Authorizing
Criminal Background Checks"); Pub. L. No. 105-277 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5119 (2001)); Pub. L. No. 92-544.
337. Pub. L. 105-277 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5119 (2001)).
338. See supra note 336.
339. See id.
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D. Medical-Forensic Issues
The lack of research, training of experts, knowledge relevant to
detection and diagnosis, and infrequency of multi-disciplinary collab-
orations has an impact on our ability to identify, pursue and treat
elder abuse and neglect. It often goes undetected and healthcare pro-
fessionals and others on the front line who come in contact with those
who may have been abused or neglected rarely are trained to identify
or report it.340 Even when it is suspected or identified, there are very
few experts who can provide medical forensic testimony in any ensu-
ing case.3 4 ' In part, this is a result of the paucity of research in the
area. 42 Unlike child abuse, where certain conditions have been
demonstrated to be "diagnostic" of abuse, no research has been con-
ducted to provide similar markers at the other end of the age spec-
trum. 4 3 If anything, the medical, scientific, and forensic issues are
more complex when arising in older people and institutional set-
tings.34 4 Forensic markers will be more difficult to develop than simi-
lar markers for child abuse and neglect, because older people often
suffer from numerous simultaneous conditions attending aging or the
diseases of old age, that may mask or mimic signs of abuse or neg-
lect. 345 For example, older people bruise more easily than younger
people, but it is important to be able to distinguish between a bruise
caused by a beating versus by some other mechanism. Similarly, frail
elders sometimes develop decubitus ulcers and malnutrition. We
need markers to assist in the determination of whether such condi-
tions were caused by neglect or by other unavoidable causes. Such
markers, however, are urgently needed and would provide an impor-
tant asset in identifying and prosecuting elder cases.
The Department thus hosted a roundtable discussion entitled
ElderJustice: Medical Forensic Issues in Elder Abuse and Neglect, to address
these issues.3 46 Experts in relevant healthcare, law enforcement, and
social service fields participated in the discussion, which resulted in a
340. See Kerry Burnright, What Areas of Further Research Would Promote the Detection and
Diagnosis of Elder Abuse and Neglect and Forensic Application Thereof. in MED. FORENSIC ISSUES,
supra note 8, 19, 23-25.
341. See id. 25.
342. See id.
343. See Mark Lachs, Selected Clinical and Forensic Issues in Elder Abuse, in MED. FORENSIC
ISSUES, supra note 8 117.
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. See supra note 8.
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report, recommendations, a transcript of the proceedings, and short
papers submitted by the experts.347
Among the myriad suggestions, the experts recommended the
creation of national or regional forensic centers for elder abuse and
neglect, similar to those for child abuse and neglect,3 4 the creation of
multi-disciplinary fatality or serious injury review teams to evaluate
cases of suspected elder abuse and neglect, 349 again, similar to those
for other types of family violence, and the training of a group of geri-
atric-forensic experts, similar to forensic pediatricians who are of great
assistance in identifying cases, referrals and interaction with the jus-
tice system. 350  Each of these recommendations, if implemented,
could have a significant impact on the justice system's ability to prose-
cute cases of abuse and neglect in residential and other settings.
To follow up on and solidify the gains of the medical forensic
roundtable, the Department funded a cooperative agreement under
which a legal-medical team of investigators will convene an advisory
group and distill recommendations for next steps. The Department
has funded a project relating to the creation of a community-based
elder fatality or serious injury review team.
The Department also has funded two research grants to examine
specific forensic issues. One grant examines elder sexual abuse and is
intended to identify forensic markers that are indicators that such
abuse has occurred. The other grant examines bruising in elders, to
assist practitioners and others to identify what types of bruising are
more likely to have been caused by abuse and neglect than by other
factors. Both the sexual abuse and bruising grants specifically ex-
amine the phenomena in long term care as well as other settings.
347. See id.
348. See William E. Hauda II, Development of a Forensic Center for the Collection of Forensic
Evidence in Abuse and Neglect Cases, in MED. FORENSIC ISSUES, supra note 8 1 62-64.
349. See Laura Mosqueda, Medical Forensic Issues in Elder Abuse: Attempting to Define the
Issues, in MED. FORENSIC ISSUES, supra note 8 136.
350. After revelations of several unnatural deaths that had been called natural, Arkan-
sas, in 1999, enacted legislation requiring a coroner to investigate all nursing home deaths.
See Testimony of Mark Malcolm before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, Mar. 4,
2002. Such death reviews, employing forensic methods, may, with proper resources and
evaluation, assist in the identification of unnatural deaths that require additional investiga-
tion and possibly, prosecution. In Pulaski County, Arkansas, the review by the county coro-
ner has resulted in a significant increase in prosecutions, particularly by the Arkansas
MFCU. See James Kuhnhenn, GAO: Nursing Homes Slow to Report Abuse Incidents, MACON
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 3, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 8369034.
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E. Funding, Research, Programs, and Statistics to Fight
Elder Victimization
The Department of Justice through its Office of Justice Programs
(OJP) funds research, training, technical assistance, coordination ef-
forts, promising practices, and the development of statistics, with the
goal of improving understanding, preventing, intervening in, report-
ing, and prosecuting of unlawful activity, and to assist the victims of
crime. Thus, OJP is uniquely situated to tap into existing expertise,
apply lessons learned in other areas, and take a national view of the
problems surrounding elder abuse and neglect. In addition to the
elder sexual abuse and bruising research grants, and the medical fo-
rensic project discussed above, (administered through the National
Institute of Justice's (NIJ) Office of Science and Technology (OST),
examples of OJP's current activities relating to elder victimization are
very briefly discussed below.
OJP's Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) elder abuse-related
projects have included (1) cosponsoring, with HHS's Administration
on Aging, a national summit of the National Center on Elder Abuse
focusing on ways to address and reduce elder victimization, (2) pro-
duction of a training module for law enforcement officers, deputies
and other first responders, with the skills needed to investigate abuse
and neglect in long term care facilities, (3) publishing a monograph
highlighting emerging initiatives in the area, and (4) funding Baylor
College of Medicine to develop an elder victimization curriculum
targeted to physicians in emergency medicine, geriatrics and general
medicine. The curriculum will cover screening, assessment, appropri-
ate interventions, reporting, and working with adult protective ser-
vices and law enforcement. The project also will generate a
publication. OJP also has provided support to District Attorneys to
develop a multi-agency approach to elder abuse using methodology
that could be replicated and serve as a national mode.
CONCLUSION
Our older population is already large and it is growing at a pro-
digious rate. The oldest of the old - those 85 and older and those
100 and older - are the fastest growing age groups. Notwithstanding
significant medical advances, advancing age often is still accompanied
by increased needs for assistance, sometimes as the result of disability,
sometimes due to other factors. The demographic imperative, thus,
requires that we address, in a meaningful fashion, how to assure that
those who need it will receive the necessary care. In the next thirty
years the number of people who need long term care is expected to
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double from about 7 to 14 million people, most of whom will rely on
others for part or all of their daily care, and on the Medicare and/or
Medicaid programs to fund part or all of their health care.
Promoting justice for this vulnerable population will continue to
be an important if daunting challenge. Meaningful change will re-
quire an ambitious, multi-faceted, well-contemplated, comprehensive,
and well-funded national plan. But it is not necessary to reinvent the
wheel. There are many lessons that may be imported from other ar-
eas (for example child abuse and domestic violence) that may inform
what efforts work and which ones should be assigned priority.
The problems are compounded by fraud and abuse that continue
to unnecessarily deplete government health care programs, just as de-
mand for those programs grows. The programs and their benefi-
ciaries are harmed when the trust fund is unlawfully depleted by
paying for goods or services that were worthless, not rendered at all,
or provided in violation of a statute, regulation, or provision that is a
condition of payment. In failure of care cases, the Department bal-
ances the law enforcement and public health goals. To that end, in
addition to damages, most failure of care cases will involve non-mone-
tary remedies of some sort. These important non-monetary remedies,
designed to improve care and protect residents, may include imposi-
tion of temporary facility monitors and protocols designed to safe-
guard care. Thus, continued anti-fraud efforts (that last year alone
recovered about $1.2 billion) are vital to the welfare of the long term
care system and its beneficiaries, particularly as the baby boomers age.
In the administration of justice the Department has supported
efforts to bridge daunting gaps in our ability to prevent, detect, diag-
nose, intervene in, treat and, where necessary, prosecute elder abuse
and neglect generally, and abuse and neglect of long term care re-
sidents in particular. The Department's activities designed to bridge
some of those gaps include education, outreach, supporting prosecu-
tions, proposing new legislation, grant-making, and sponsoring re-
search, promising projects, statistical analysis and medical forensic
activities.
These efforts are beginning to see results. Federal prosecutions
with remedies designed to improve care and protect vulnerable re-
sidents are on the rise. Thousands of residents live in facilities that
are now subject to greater scrutiny. Thousands of people have re-
ceived training. Myriad entities are finding new ways to work col-
laboratively at the national, state and local levels. Some researchers
have embarked on studies that promise to advance our state of knowl-
edge. Numerous innovative and promising programs are underway.
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But, while we are gaining a better understanding about some aspects
of the problem much still remains to be done.
Given the chasm between what is and what should be, it is vital
that the relevant entities be vigilant, coordinate, and undertake such
measures as they possess and are able in their respective realms of
responsibility and authority. Some such activities relating to federal
law enforcement have been discussed in this article.
The importance of defending the universal human right to live
free of suffering caused by abuse and neglect does not diminish with
advancing age. We must be watchful that the insidious presumption
that "old people will die soon anyway" does not beget inaction or excuse
ignorance; that it does not result in the devaluation of lives just be-
cause they are old or frail. Otherwise victims suffer twice: once from
the abuse or neglect itself; and a second time from the inadequate or
nonexistent response to their suffering due to a lack of detection,
treatment, intervention, and prosecution. The cost of abuse and neg-
lect is high. It is paid in unnecessary human suffering, loss of life,
higher healthcare costs and depleted public resources. And, it is
borne disproportionately by the frailest among us. If we can unlock
the mysteries of science to live longer lives, we also must take the cor-
responding measures to assure that those longer lives can be lived free
of the indignities of abuse, neglect and exploitation.
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